Military Review English Edition November-December 2014 | Page 33

LOSING OUR WAY

develop situations through close contact with enemy
forces.10 In the 3rd Infantry Division, which led the
Army’s drive to the Iraqi capital, the cavalry squadron
possessed this ability and performed well; the brigade
reconnaissance troop and battalion scout platoons
did not perform well—they struggled to execute their
missions.
Events overcame these concerns. In 2004, the Army
began its transition to a modular force structure better
suited to sustaining a high tempo of unit deployments
in a COIN environment. The overall number of BCTs
increased, resourced partly through the elimination of
the division cavalry squadron. In subsequent actions
the Army converted the 2nd and 3rd Armored Cavalry
Regiments into Stryker BCTs, thereby eliminating the
last organizations with the organic tools, doctrinal underpinning, and specialized training to execute a broad
range of reconnaissance and security operations.11 The
new reconnaissance squadrons of the modular BCTs
possessed fewer capabilities and embraced the reconnaissance and surveillance orientation of the original
RSTA squadrons.

Rise of the Battlefield Surveillance
Brigade
The disappearance of the armored cavalry regiment
and division cavalry squadron left command echelons
above the brigade without a dedicated reconnaissance
and security organization. The battlefield surveillance
brigade (BFSB) became the de facto replacement for
these units. Equipped with a variety of intelligence
collection, assessment, and fusion capabilities, it was
optimized to operate across a broad area, and over
time, to develop a detailed depiction of hostile activity
and networks—attributes suited to the operational
environments of Iraq and Afghanistan.12 The BFSB
marked the culmination of a trend in reconnaissance
and security organizations begun with the new contact
paradigm and the RSTA squadron. The new unit
incorporated similar organizational and operational
concepts on a larger scale. Indeed, the brigade’s initial
designation as a RSTA brigade underscored these
roots.
Consequently, the BFSB lacked the organic means
to conduct screen, guard, and cover missions. It could
not fight for information, it could not lead and protect
friendly forces in a movement to contact situation,
MILITARY REVIEW  November-December 2014

and it could not ensure friendly forces freedom of
maneuver without hostile interference. Its surveillance
capabilities outstripped its reconnaissance capabilities, while the BFSB’s minimal combat power made it
dependent on other organizations to act on the intelligence it did obtain. Exclusive employment in COIN
operations, however, cloaked its inability to operate in
the presence of an aggressive threat or in a fast-moving
combined arms maneuver operation.
In Afghanistan and Iraq, surveillance, force protection, and area security considerations outweighed the
need for screen, guard, and cover missions. Hence, for
over a decade organizations primarily oriented toward
information collection—like the BFSB—thrived, and
the prewar tilt toward reconnaissance and surveillance
became a persistent doctrinal trend. The COINcentric nature of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
expanded the doctrinal footprint of surveillance while
diminishing that of traditional active security missions.
Sustained COIN operations necessitated long-term
monitoring of areas, activities, and people. As a result,
reconnaissance and security organizations became
associated with reconnaissance and surveillance.
This change in association was and still is promulgated throughout the Army via numerous sources,
including U.S. Army Force Management Support
Agency’s Force Management System Web.13 This online source provides descriptions of unit organizations,
equipment authorizations, and primary missions. It
constitutes a quick reference for soldiers, providing
basic information without requiring the user to navigate numerous publications. In nearly every instance,
ground cavalry organizations are identified as reconnaissance and surveillance units. Yet surveillance is
not security. Surveillance does not include the active
measures inherent in security missions, which both
shape and protect the brigade commander’s ability to
maneuver free from threat interference.

Doctrinal Confusion
These developments eroded Army cognizance of
traditional security missions and disassociated them
from specially trained reconnaissance and security
organizations. Paradoxically, new doctrinal publications neither asserted a divestiture of screen, guard,
and cover missions nor affirmed in a forthright manner their importance. In Army Doctrine Reference
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