Military Review English Edition November-December 2014 | Page 28

maneuvers, all U.S. conventional combat brigades
where extremely restrictive terrain often demanded
should be equipped with organic armored transport to
steady-state foot patrols, vehicles were used extenachieve victory.
sively to buttress defensive positions and enable rapid
Stability operations present another potential sce- response. For example, the famed rescue in Ganjgal
nario where IBCTs may need motorized integration
Valley on 8 September 2009, where two soldiers each
to achieve operational success. With global populaearned the Medal of Honor for conducting mounted
tion trends moving toward greater urbanization and
casualty evacuation, centered on the use of vehicles
the proliferation of megacities,
to add critically needed mobilthe Army will again find itself
ity to a protracted fight.11
engaged among dense populaIt should be apparent
The structural and conceptions in urban environments.9
tual transition of IBCTs from
that light infantry
It should be apparent that
light to motorized, from tralight infantry brigades will
ditional infantry to mobile asbrigades will need
need wheeled, networked, and
sault troops, would find many
protected transportation to
opponents. Traditionalists
wheeled, networked,
operate effectively in urban
would argue against dilution
and protected
environments. The current
of the infantry fighting spirit;
unarmored platforms could,
however, integrated transport
transportation to
conceivably, provide adequate,
would enhance rather than
but highly vulnerable, mobility operate effectively in
dilute the lethality of the
in an extremely low-threat
riflemen. Others would argue
environment. However, the
urban environments.
against increased attention
increasingly sophisticated use
demanded by wheeled mainteof weapons in counterinsurgency campaigns necessinance, but the cost would be far less than in mechatates vehicle improvements that would afford marknized battalions and would be worth the investment.
edly increased survivability and manueverability.10
Still others may assert that the IBCT formations are
The recent operational experience in Iraq, and to
designed to deploy rapidly and operate on restrictive
a lesser—but also relevant—extent in Afghanistan,
terrain that precludes vehicle use. This assertion is
validated the need to complement light infantry
false. Instead of structuring for narrow utility, the
with protected mobility within the fighting formaIBCTs should be trained and equipped for a broader
tions of the IBCTs. For maneuver brigades to wield
range of expeditionary postures, ready for offensive,
maximum influence over their area of operations,
defensive, and stability operations across diverse
commanders needed the tactical versatility to project operational areas.
both mounted and dismounted elements over long
distances to produce synergistic effects. In contrast,
Questioning Legacy Capabilities
the current vehicular support structure employed by
The debate over the future of the IBCT should
the light brigades limits their potential to dominate
address the expense versus the viability of the airthe full range of military operations. Given the design borne brigade on the contemporary battlefield. With
intent for IBCTs to serve as modular, indepenfive infantry brigades planned to be airborne, and
dent, and conditionally self-reliant formations, they
another three as helicopter assault, the Army should
should be equipped and trained for a wider range of
reassess the feasibility of maintaining 24 percent of
functions.
its maneuver force as aerial soldiers in the face of
As light infantry units are configured, every
increasingly lethal anti-access technology that makes
rifle battalion needs significant theater-equipment
large-scale airborne insertion largely obsolete.
augmentation to perform even a portion of the
With threats such as third-generation infrared
stability tasks previously mastered in places like
surface-to-air missiles proliferating, and an Air Force
Mosul, Ramadi, and Baghdad. Even in Afghanistan,
transport community increasingly hesitant to deliver
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November-December 2014  MILITARY REVIEW