Military Review English Edition November-December 2014 | Page 27
Bringing Mobility to the IBCT
An amber luminous glow caused by the filtered light of a sand
storm is accented by the search lights of mine resistant ambush
protected vehicles from the 573rd Clearance Company, 1st
Engineer Battalion, 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry
Division. The vehicles were staging before departing on a convoy
route-clearing mission near Tikrit, Iraq, 22 February 2010.
(Photo by Chief Petty Officer Michael Heckman, Joint Combat Camera Center Iraq.)
have arisen and will arise that require minimal vehicle
support—such as jungle fighting, mountain operations,
and airborne insertion—many future joint endeavors
will require robust vehicle augmentation for ground
brigades to be effective independently. These will range
from offense and defense to stability operations. To
support various contingencies, motorizing infantry
formations would allow greater flexibility in a force
package.
In contrast, the IBCTs now are vulnerable because
they lack organic mobility. The Army will keep having
MILITARY REVIEW November-December 2014
to hastily augment the rifle battalions with hundreds
of armored trucks in order to project ground effects
rapidly over any appreciable distance.
Foremost among the high-intensity scenarios anticipated is one where U.S. ground forces will deploy to
deter, degrade, or remove hostile regimes. While some
wars will require less vehicle density—as was the case
in Grenada, Panama, and Afghanistan—others will require more vehicle-centric maneuver, as in Iraq. Similar
to the combined arms offensives against Iraq forces in
1991 and 2003, IBCTs may be called on to follow and
support the more lethal and survivable mechanized
brigades that would spearhead any penetration. Based
on their current equipment, light brigades are inadequate to fulfill this critical role, which would require
sustained movement behind a rapid armored advance
while fighting through residual resistance and securing
key terrain.7
The most recent American large-scale offensive,
the 2003 march to Baghdad, offers perhaps the most
compelling example of the IBCTs’ limitations. When a
mechanized division with a &