Military Review English Edition November-December 2014 | Page 27

Bringing Mobility to the IBCT An amber luminous glow caused by the filtered light of a sand storm is accented by the search lights of mine resistant ambush protected vehicles from the 573rd Clearance Company, 1st Engineer Battalion, 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division. The vehicles were staging before departing on a convoy route-clearing mission near Tikrit, Iraq, 22 February 2010. (Photo by Chief Petty Officer Michael Heckman, Joint Combat Camera Center Iraq.) have arisen and will arise that require minimal vehicle support—such as jungle fighting, mountain operations, and airborne insertion—many future joint endeavors will require robust vehicle augmentation for ground brigades to be effective independently. These will range from offense and defense to stability operations. To support various contingencies, motorizing infantry formations would allow greater flexibility in a force package. In contrast, the IBCTs now are vulnerable because they lack organic mobility. The Army will keep having MILITARY REVIEW  November-December 2014 to hastily augment the rifle battalions with hundreds of armored trucks in order to project ground effects rapidly over any appreciable distance. Foremost among the high-intensity scenarios anticipated is one where U.S. ground forces will deploy to deter, degrade, or remove hostile regimes. While some wars will require less vehicle density—as was the case in Grenada, Panama, and Afghanistan—others will require more vehicle-centric maneuver, as in Iraq. Similar to the combined arms offensives against Iraq forces in 1991 and 2003, IBCTs may be called on to follow and support the more lethal and survivable mechanized brigades that would spearhead any penetration. Based on their current equipment, light brigades are inadequate to fulfill this critical role, which would require sustained movement behind a rapid armored advance while fighting through residual resistance and securing key terrain.7 The most recent American large-scale offensive, the 2003 march to Baghdad, offers perhaps the most compelling example of the IBCTs’ limitations. When a mechanized division with a &