Military Review English Edition November-December 2014 | Page 22

Notes
1. John Vandiver, “U.S. Army’s Last Tanks Depart Germany,” Stars and Stripes, 4 April 2013, http://www.stripes.com/
us-army-s-last-tanks-depart-from-germany-1.214977.
2. Matt M. Matthews, We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006
Hezbollah-Israeli War, The Long War Series Occasional Paper 26
(Ft. Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Combat
Studies Institute Press, 2008).
3. For other recently published arguments for the continued
importance of armor in U.S. force structure, see David B. Haight,
Paul J. Laughlin, and Kyle F. Bergner, “Armor: Key to the Future
Fight,” Armed Forces Journal, March 2013, http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/armor-key-to-the-future-fight/; Bill Hix and
Mark C. Smith, “Armor’s Asymmetric Advantage,” Armed Forces
Journal, October 2012, http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/
armors-asymmetric-advantage/; and, Chris McKinney, Mark Elfendahl, and H. R. McMaster, “Why the U.S. Army Needs Armor:
the Case for a Balanced Force,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2013,
129.
4. Scott R. Gourley, “Heavy Metal: Arguing the Continued
Need for Abrams in Action,” HIS Jane’s International Defense
Review, 10 September 2012, http://www.benning.army.mil/armor/
content/pdf/IDR%2010%20Sept%202012.pdf.
5. Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-3-0, U.S.
Army Capstone Concept (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 19 December 2012), 15.
6. Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down, (New York: Penguin,
2000), 135, 242, 310.
7. Col. Brian Drinkwine, Task Force One Panther commander,
Al-Fallujah, Iraq, 2003-2004. (Author’s personal observations.)
8. U.S. Army Human Resources Command, Department of
the Army, Memorandum, Recommendation for the Award of
Presidential Unit Citation for the Headquarters and Headquarters
Company, 2nd Battalion, 2nd Infantry, 4 August 2005.
9. The four battles were Aachen (1944), Manila (1945), Seoul
(1950), and Hue (1968). See Alec Wahlman, The Evolution of U.S.
Military Capabilities in the Urban Environment from World War
Two to Vietnam, unpublished dissertation, University of Leeds,
UK, 2012.
10. Martin Van Creveld, The Sword and The Olive, (New York:
Public Affairs, 2002), 233, 236.
11. Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly,
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2000), 121; Wesley K.
Clark, Waging Modern War, (New York: Public Affairs, 2001),
275-276, 355.
12. Our colleague Dr. Kevin Woods deserves credit for
reminding us of the relative learning time lines presented by
conventional combat operations versus irregular warfare.
13. David M. Glantz, Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on
the Eve of World War (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas,
1998), 55, 116-146, 295.
14. In April 2003, a mixed force of 30 Bradleys and 14
Abrams (supported by mortars, artillery, and aircraft) entered
Baghdad to take and hold several locations, including three
key highway interchanges. Over the next two days all but one
of these objectives were held against heavy enemy counterattacks, costing enemy forces over 120 vehicles and in excess of

20

600 killed. See David Zucchino, Thunder Runs: The Armored
Strike to Capture Baghdad (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press,
2004).
15. Gen. Raymond Odierno, U.S. Army chief of staff, transcript of a discussion at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, DC: 1 November 2012), http://
csis.org/event/military-strategy-forum-future-united-states-army-critical-questions-period-transition.
16. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The General’s
War, (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), 393-395,
402, 475; Norman Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take a Hero, (New
York: Bantam, 1992), 400.
17. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II,
(New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), 228-229, 304-309.
18. Jason Conroy, Heavy Metal, (Washington, DC: Potomac
Books, 2005), 195-209.
19. Christopher F. Foss, Jane’s Armour and Artillery 20102011 (Surrey, UK: HIS Jane’s, 2010), 177.
20. James Logan, former U.S. Army armor officer, with extensive experience in analyzing armored vehicles and programs at
the Institute for Defense Analyses, email to author, 16 January
2013.
21. Foss, 30, 39, 60, 75, 175-179.
22. 113th Congress, National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2014: 534-535.
23. Dennis P. Finn, “The Abrams-Crusader Common Engine:
Help is on the Way,” Armor, CXI(2)(March-April 2002): 42;
Christopher F. Foss, Jane’s Armour and Artillery 2002-2005,
(Surrey, UK: HIS Jane’s, 2004), 158; Christopher F. Foss and
Richard Strickland, eds., Jane’s Armour and Artillery Upgrades
2003-2004, (Surrey, UK: HIS Jane’s, 2003), 267-268.
24. Maneuver Center of Excellence Supplemental Manual
3-90: Force Structure Reference Data, Brigade Combat Teams
(Fort Benning, GA: September 2011), 88-166.
25. Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 240. Example discussed
regarding the the Army’s 507th Maintenance Company, which
suffered heavy losses passing through Nasiriyah, Iraq, in 2003.
26. HEAT (High Explosive Antitank) warheads have shapedcharged explosives that penetrate armor via the shape of the
explosion formed by the warhead. Sabot rounds rely instead on
the kinetic energy of a dense metal dart to penetrate armor.
27. Tom Clancy and Chuck Horner, Every Man a Tiger, (New
York: G. P. Putnam’s and Sons, 1999), 337, 346. In 1991, stealth
F-117s Nighthawk aircraft were used to penetrate Iraqi air
defenses and attack key air defense nodes from within, making
Iraqi airspace safer for other nonstealth aircraft.
28. Martin Van Creveld, The Sword and the Olive (New York:
Public Affairs, 1998), 217-237.
29. “XM1111 Mid Range Munition,” http://www.deagel.com/
Projectiles/XM1111-Mid-Range-Munition_a001136001.aspx;
Leland S. Ness and Anthony G. Williams, Jane’s Ammunition
Handbook: 2011-2012 (Surrey, UK: IHS Jane’s, 2011), 449.
30. Su pplemental Manual 3-90: 106.
31. “Army Sending Tanks to Eastern Europe as Tensions
Escalate with Russia,” Inside the Pentagon, 14 September 2014,
Vol. 30, No. 36.

November-December 2014  MILITARY REVIEW