Military Review English Edition November-December 2014 | Page 17

M1 ABRAMS

took the Wehrmacht’s armored formations only a few
weeks to overrun France’s key terrain, a span of time
far shorter than the French army needed to adapt to
the new mobile threat. Additionally, several ArabIsraeli wars have presented each side with but days to
learn, limiting adaptation to its most shallow forms.
By way of comparison, the early German successes
in Europe in the late 1930s with mechanized forces
shocked the Soviet Union into rapidly reforming their
armored forces starting in mid-1940, just one year
before the Wehrmacht attacked. Although the Soviet
Union had developed a large armor force prior to
World War II, Stalin’s purges gutted the Red Army of
its human capital for mechanized warfare just before
the Nazi invasion. As a result, when the Germans
crossed the Soviet border in June 1941, not one of the
Red Army’s 61 tank division commanders had more
than 12 months in command, and the state of the organization, training, and logistical support for the Soviet
mechanized forces was abysmal. The issue was not so
much materiel, as the Soviets enjoyed a 3:1 advantage
in tanks and assault guns (11,000 vs. 3,600), but rather
deficiencies in the broader suite of factors that makes
any particular weapon system effective (such as doctrine, organization, training, and personnel).13
Fortunately for the Soviets, the Red Army was able
to trade vast amounts of territory for time, though it
suffered massive losses. It had enough time to reconstitute an armored force and adjust tactics. The sheer
vastness of Russia allowed the Red Army the several
years it needed—a cost probably only the Soviet Union
could afford to pay.
Unfortunately, neither the French nor the Israelis
had the luxury of trading space for time in order to
adapt to the new mobile threat, as did the Soviet
Union. Moreover, in the current security environment,
it is unlikely the United States will have the luxury
of time to respond to a crisis that would be mitigated
in large part by sending armored units. Despite remarkable technological advances in weapons systems,
physically holding ground still matters. Several past
U.S. ground counteroffensives would have looked very
different if there had been no launching pads available—as there were in the Pusan Perimeter (1950)
during the Korean War, in Saudi Arabia (1991) during
Operation Desert Storm, and in Kuwait (2003) at the
outset of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Support to allies
MILITARY REVIEW  November-December 2014

and partners would also suffer in the conduct of security force assistance, as a much smaller U.S. Army tank
community would have proportionally less capability.
Were the United States military to sharply reduce
(e.g., by 50 percent or more) its heavy mechanized
capabilities, building that force back up (not necessarily
to today’s level) would likely be a mid-term proposition
requiring at least several years. Although the United
States currently faces little threat of being overrun
by mechanized forces, its global network of allies and
partners includes many nations that do. If not pre-positioned or already deployed, many potential scenarios
might be decided by employment of even a modest armored force (e.g., one tank company) over a fairly short
period via air to some key terrain such as an airfield
or port. Efforts by an enemy to overrun such a force
would prove very difficult, as Iraqi forces in Baghdad
discovered in 2003.14
Army Chief of Staff Gen. Raymond Odierno has
implied a continued role for heavy forces in the future.
In a November 2012 address, he stated, “I want an
Army that is capable of many missions at many speeds,
many sizes, under many different conditions, and the
capability to operate in any environment.”15

Suite of Improvements
Let us stipulate that U.S. ground combat forces
in the future must continue to be composed of a mix
of forces as seen today, spanning from light to heavy
mechanized. What capabilities might the main battle
tanks provide in the heavy mechanized component of
that mix, whatever its relative size in the overall force?
Tactical solutions worth serious consideration
cannot be conceived in a resource vacuum, and any
future developments for heavy armor in the U.S.
military need to anticipate austere budgets ahead. The
conclusion of the nation-building wars in Asia, and
the difficult decisions that will be forced on Congress
and the White House from the current massive federal
deficits, will almost certainly foster an era of less for the
Department of Defense. Therefore, major new weapons development initiatives will be minimal. All-new,
cutting-edge systems entail much technological risk,
require long timelines to develop and field, and often
include substantial increases in unit cost. The coming
era is unlikely to tolerate such cost and risk for ground
force systems.
15