Military Review English Edition November-December 2014 | Page 15

M1 ABRAMS

approximately 2040, almost 90 years since it was first
introduced.
Similarly, while some would argue that the tank
today does not play as dominant a role in countering
enemy armor as it used to, it would be a gross exaggeration to assert that it will no longer play a useful role
on the future battlefield. Since its first fielding in 1980,
the role of the Abrams has expanded well beyond
readiness to defeat Soviet armor in the open terrain of
Germany’s Fulda Gap, the mission originally envisioned by many.
One example of the Abrams’ expanded role is in
counterinsurgency operations. The emergence of the
improvised explosive device in the last decade and the
class of new vehicles it spawned serve as a reminder
of why highly survivable ground vehicles are important in such environments. A U.S. Marine Corps
Abrams-equipped armor company that deployed to
Afghanistan in 2011 completed its tour having suffered only one wounded in action, despite experiencing

MILITARY REVIEW  November-December 2014

19 improvised explosive device strikes.4 This is not to
argue that tanks are the solution to all or even most of
the challenges while conducting counterinsurgency,
but that, as noted in the new Army Capstone Concept,
the Abram’s combination of high mobility and protected firepower can at times prove of paramount importance in such environments.5
Urban warfare is another example of the Abrams’
expanded role. The contrast between Mogadishu
in 1993 and Baghdad in 2003 highlighted the
game-changing role tanks can play in an urban environment. Lack of even a modest U.S. armor presence
in Somalia hobbled mission efforts, requiring United
Nations armor (Pakistani forces) be called upon to
mount a rescue effort of surrounded Army Rangers
and other special operations forces in October 1993.6
In stark contrast, the rapid seizure of Baghdad and
quick defeat of organized Iraqi forces at the outset
of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 were largely the
result of Iraqi inability to effectively counter highly
mobile heavy armor in an urban environment.
Additionally, one of this article’s authors had
first-hand experience in combat operations with
the Abrams in Fallujah, Iraq. From the fall of 2003
through the spring of 2004, the Abrams proved its
worth in supporting raids and cordon-and-search
operations in and around the city in operations conducted by Task Force One Panther. The Abrams was
adept at securing key terrain, providing overwatch
with its sensors, and intimidating the insurgents with
its imposing physical presence.7 The Abrams would
also later play a decisive role in Operation Phantom
Fury, the assault into Fallujah in November 2004. A
Presidential Unit Citation issued for operations in
Fallujah described “the overwhelming combat power,
speed, and shock effect of the incredibly lethal mechanized infantry and armor units … .”8
The decisive value of armor in an urban environment is also supported by research conducted by
the other author of this article, who closely analyzed
four major urban battles fought by U.S. ground forces
(World War II to Vietnam) for a doctoral dissertation in military history. In all four cases, tanks proved
crucial for the success of U.S. forces in urban environments, including at Hue City (1968), when poor
weather over an entire month greatly reduced the air
support available.9
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