Military Review English Edition November-December 2014 | Page 143
BOOK REVIEWS
Hay to be actively involved in government without
appearing to be angling for a job. Eventually he landed
a short ambassadorship to England, followed by his
appointment as secretary of state.
The story is not one of hero worship, nor does it get
bogged down as a recital of Hay’s many accomplishments. The author exposes and examines Hay’s myriad
professional and intimate personal connections and
friendships. We read of his love for not one, but two,
married woman of prominence. The letters between
Hay’s intimates themselves and to Hay provide a depth
of character expertly captured by Taliaferro.
Of note in this excellent work is the chapter concerning the time during Hay’s absence from government. The chapter outlining this phase of Hay’s life
contains a volume of correspondence that depicts his
internal struggle; from feeling as though he has not
done enough to uphold Lincolnian principles, to feeling
that he has done everything he could. This is actually the book’s strength, as it allows the reader to feel
the weight of Hay’s personal struggle to find his place
across the century.
This book is of relevance to the security community
in that it paints a very intimate picture of an individual
in a position to have a vast impact on worldly affairs.
Overall it is an excellent, enlightening, and entertaining
read.
Maj. Joshua B. Jordan, U.S. Army, Fort Lee,
Virginia
BROTHERS IN ARMS:
Chinese Aid to the Khmer Rouge, 1975-1979
Andrew Mertha, Cornell University Press, Ithaca,
New York, 2014, 175 pages, $29.95
I
n the center of Cambodia is the former
Democratic Kampuchea military airfield at Krang
Leav. Built with Chinese money and technical
expertise, it was the crown jewel of Chinese foreign
aid to the short-lived Khmer Rouge regime (19751979). Before becoming operational, the airfield was
overrun by neighboring Vietnamese troops in 1979.
Looking at a long-abandoned airfield in 2010, author
Andrew Mertha wonders what exactly did this aid buy
the Chinese? In Brothers in Arms Mertha, a political
MILITARY REVIEW November-December 2014
scientist and university professor, examines China’s
foreign aid to Democratic Kampuchea (DK). This leads
him to the greater question of “Why was a powerful
state like China unable to influence its far weaker and
ostensibly dependent client state?” In his detailed analysis, Mertha quickly sets forth a persuasive and interesting argument that Chinese aid bought little in the
way of influencing the policies of the DK government,
despite being that regime’s only patron.
He attributes this outcome principally to two reasons. The first, and most important to his argument,
revolves around Chinese bureaucratic fragmentation
in its foreign aid policy development and execution.
Rather than rational decision making, it was institutional restraints, most notably in communication and
lines of authority, that drove policy. Second, DK’s secretive, complex, and in many cases fratricidal internal
institutions were paradoxically able to resist Chinese
influence and, at the same time, remain ill equipped to
take advantage of Chinese aid.
To highlight his argument, Mertha uses three case
studies that examine aid related to military, infrastructure, and trade projects. A vivid picture emerges of this
almost unknown foreign aid program that kept the DK
government afloat, helping the reader understand the
ultimately counterintuitive patron-client state relationship. These case studies provide deeper insight on
governance in Democratic Kampuchea, going beyond
the well-documented subject of the “killing fields.”
Why is all of this important? Mertha makes the
case that an assessment of the China’s foreign aid to
DK, especially regarding bureaucratic politics and
processes, helps us better understand China’s inevitable
attempts to expand her influence in Southeast Asia
through “seductive, no strings attached” foreign aid.
This is relevant since the author posits not much has
changed with China’s institutional fragmentation in
their current foreign aid programs. Finally, this book
provokes further reflection on the dynamics and expected outcomes of any nation’s foreign aid program.
This slim volume is well documented. The author
used Cambodian and Chinese archival documents,
including those from the Cambodian commission
currently investigating the policies and practices of the
Khmer Rouge regime, as well as interviews of Chinese
experts who worked in DK and Cambodian survivors of the regime. Filled with great detail, the book
141