Military Review English Edition November-December 2014 | Page 139

BOOK REVIEWS

well-published and current historians for the country they researched. Their research is evident in the
sources and time periods discussed. Each addresses the
evolution of D-Day remembrance and memory from 6
June 1944 through today with one author including the
impact of social media.
Having visited Normandy four times, I strongly recommend the book to anyone who is a student of D-Day
or planning a visit to Normandy.
James L. Kennedy, Jr., Fairfax, Virginia

THE WRONG ENEMY:
America in Afghanistan, 2001-2014
Carlotta Gall, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, New
York, 2014, 329 pages, $28.00

A

fter more than 13 years of war at a cost of
nearly a trillion dollars and over 2,300 U.S.
soldiers killed in action, have
we been fighting the wrong enemy
in Afghanistan? The answer to that
question is the focus of Carlotta Gall’s
book The Wrong Enemy. Gall’s central
theme is that, despite the costly efforts
of the U.S. and its allies to bring
stability to Afghanistan, Pakistan has
been actively working against them.
While the covert Pakistan-Taliban
relationship is a key focus of this
book, Gall’s work shows that it is only
one factor in a complex situation that
has been made worse by years of miscalculations and missed opportunities
by all the parties involved.
Claims of Pakistan support for
Taliban are nothing new and have been reported by
other sources for years. What makes this work unique
is how Gall expertly guides the reader through the
historical and political labyrinth that defines this
relationship using a combination of first-hand observations, interviews, and second-hand accounts.
Her intimate knowledge of the region and its players
is enhanced by her nearly continuous traveling and
reporting from both Pakistan and Afghanistan since
9/11.
MILITARY REVIEW  November-December 2014

The story of Pakistan’s rocky 30-year relationship
with the Taliban is recounted from the standpoint
of both past and current members of the Taliban,
as well as from Pakistanis with intimate knowledge
of Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) agency.
From the beginning of the Pakistan-Taliban relationship, training and financial support were provided
through a special branch of the ISI manned by retired
officers from the Pakistan army. Over the decades, a
very close relationship developed that continued to
expand even after 9/11 and the start of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan. However, in the last few years
the ISI’s influence has started to falter as the Taliban
has become more radical, and it increasingly appeared
Pakistan had created a monster it could no longer
control.
As an example, Col. Imam, a graduate of U.S.
Special Forces training, began working with the
Taliban after his retirement from the Pakistan military in the 1990s. Imam developed a close relationship
with the Taliban and even became
Mullah Omar’s mentor after 9/11.
As the Taliban’s religious extremism
increased, he was eventually detained
and executed despite pleas from the
ISI for his release. Additionally, Gall
suggests that Pakistan’s double-dealings with the U.S. and the Taliban
potentially has had negative effects on
its own military as she reports growing
support among young Pakistani officers for the Taliban and their goals.
Another theme Gall investigates is
the relationship between the U.S and
Afghanistan President Ahmed Karzai.
She readily acknowledges the corruption of the Karzai government and
that his focus on the tactics of tribal politics instead of
strategy has worsened the war. Nevertheless, she does
try to evaluate the war from his perspective. She maintains that no one should be surprised with the levels
of corruption found in Karzai’s government given that
he is a poor administrator who has been overwhelmed
with vast sums of money. Second, Gall feels that the
U.S. approach to the war, particularly in terms of civilian casualties, has severely weakened Karzai’s ability to
control the Afghan political situation.
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