Military Review English Edition November-December 2014 | Page 124
Continental Army during the brutal and messy struggle
for independence, at which time Washington drew upon
the lessons of past experiences—many bitter—coupled
with his own wisdom, to develop principled approaches
that are models for today’s leaders.
During his narrative, Beirne bluntly addresses the
critical questions: “Why should we care about this
history? Why is it relevant in today’s postmodern era?”
His answer is that the Constitution under which we
live—the supreme law of the land—was shaped by
the events recounted and can only be fully appreciated by understanding the circumstances of the decisions Washington made. For example, Washington’s
Revolutionary War powers established precedents
from which today’s presidential powers were derived.
Readers are invited to judge for themselves the relevance of Washington’s precedents today.
Beirne explores Washington’s pragmatic attitude
regarding the treatment of enemy combatants. While
he freely admits much of the modern world now takes
a more humane approach toward prisoners of war,
Beirne affirms that presidents still must address fundamental questions: What must be done to defend the
American people? How extreme can the measures for
defending the people be?
Using historical events supported by official documents and the personal letters of Washington, Beirne
clearly outlines the escalating “mistreatment” problem faced by Washington. A highly principled man,
Washington abhorred prisoner abuse, but he nevertheless countenanced it as a counterthreat to British abuse
of prisoners and civilians. As a result, abuse became
a weapon that Washington used to retaliate against
British torture and, therefore, he helped prevent harm
to his people. It was a horrible, but practical, tool employed by Washington under the assumption that in
doing so he was carrying out his foremost obligation to
protect Americans and the revolution itself.
While Washington felt little obligation to seek
congressional guidance in matters of prisoner treatment, he nevertheless sought to adhere to congressional
authority in the execution of the war. Beirne asserts his
example became the embodiment of what later would
be enshrined in constitutional powers as the duties and
prerogatives of the commander in chief.
By exploring the natural distrust and suspicion
the populace hel d for a powerful army in a republic
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system of government, Beirne skillfully guides the
reader through the tumultuous relationship between
Washington and the feebly empowered Continental
Congress. He describes the experiment of congressional
control over the war efforts during the initial phases of
the revolution and Washington’s extraordinary effort
to adhere to confused, unsynchronized congressional
mandates and directives.
Among the many issues with which Washington
struggled, the Continental Congress’s lack of legislative
power to compel states’ compliance to national strategic
goals made the essential tasks of paying, feeding, and
equipping the Continental Army nearly impossible for
him. After a series of battlefield defeats, Washington
capitalized on the public trust in his personal leadership, impeccable character, and demonstrated loyalty
to challenge congressional war authority and to shame
Congress into providing support. Nevertheless, Beirne
clearly points out that Washington never attempted to
usurp congressional authority over civilian matters.
Intent on protecting the republic, this “republican general” purposefully confined the exercise of his
powers to control over the military at a vulnerable time
when opportunity and temptation provided him ample
opportunity and power to do otherwise. In a final, resounding point, Beirne asserts when the framers of the
Constitution designated the president as commander in
chief, it was clear that Washington’s wartime example
prompted them to include the broad authority to lead
the military in defending the nation, as demonstrated
through Washington’s battlefield leadership. One of
those powers delegated to the military was the authority to direct its own tribunals separate from the authority exercised by Congress over the American people.
Examining another dimension of Washington’s
leadership, Beirne tells the gripping story of Benedict
Arnold’s treasonous plot to surrender the American
fortress at West Point, New York. In doing so, Beirne
places the reader in the center of one of Washington’s
most serious dilemmas.
Overlapping and contradictory congressional and
state laws, as well as international customs that determined “who were subject to military jurisdiction and
who came under the cognizance of civil power,” created what Washington admitted was a “confused state.”
Providing a historical overview of the origins, processes,
and differences between courts martial and military
November-December 2014 MILITARY REVIEW