Military Review English Edition November-December 2014 | Page 124

Continental Army during the brutal and messy struggle for independence, at which time Washington drew upon the lessons of past experiences—many bitter—coupled with his own wisdom, to develop principled approaches that are models for today’s leaders. During his narrative, Beirne bluntly addresses the critical questions: “Why should we care about this history? Why is it relevant in today’s postmodern era?” His answer is that the Constitution under which we live—the supreme law of the land—was shaped by the events recounted and can only be fully appreciated by understanding the circumstances of the decisions Washington made. For example, Washington’s Revolutionary War powers established precedents from which today’s presidential powers were derived. Readers are invited to judge for themselves the relevance of Washington’s precedents today. Beirne explores Washington’s pragmatic attitude regarding the treatment of enemy combatants. While he freely admits much of the modern world now takes a more humane approach toward prisoners of war, Beirne affirms that presidents still must address fundamental questions: What must be done to defend the American people? How extreme can the measures for defending the people be? Using historical events supported by official documents and the personal letters of Washington, Beirne clearly outlines the escalating “mistreatment” problem faced by Washington. A highly principled man, Washington abhorred prisoner abuse, but he nevertheless countenanced it as a counterthreat to British abuse of prisoners and civilians. As a result, abuse became a weapon that Washington used to retaliate against British torture and, therefore, he helped prevent harm to his people. It was a horrible, but practical, tool employed by Washington under the assumption that in doing so he was carrying out his foremost obligation to protect Americans and the revolution itself. While Washington felt little obligation to seek congressional guidance in matters of prisoner treatment, he nevertheless sought to adhere to congressional authority in the execution of the war. Beirne asserts his example became the embodiment of what later would be enshrined in constitutional powers as the duties and prerogatives of the commander in chief. By exploring the natural distrust and suspicion the populace hel d for a powerful army in a republic 122 system of government, Beirne skillfully guides the reader through the tumultuous relationship between Washington and the feebly empowered Continental Congress. He describes the experiment of congressional control over the war efforts during the initial phases of the revolution and Washington’s extraordinary effort to adhere to confused, unsynchronized congressional mandates and directives. Among the many issues with which Washington struggled, the Continental Congress’s lack of legislative power to compel states’ compliance to national strategic goals made the essential tasks of paying, feeding, and equipping the Continental Army nearly impossible for him. After a series of battlefield defeats, Washington capitalized on the public trust in his personal leadership, impeccable character, and demonstrated loyalty to challenge congressional war authority and to shame Congress into providing support. Nevertheless, Beirne clearly points out that Washington never attempted to usurp congressional authority over civilian matters. Intent on protecting the republic, this “republican general” purposefully confined the exercise of his powers to control over the military at a vulnerable time when opportunity and temptation provided him ample opportunity and power to do otherwise. In a final, resounding point, Beirne asserts when the framers of the Constitution designated the president as commander in chief, it was clear that Washington’s wartime example prompted them to include the broad authority to lead the military in defending the nation, as demonstrated through Washington’s battlefield leadership. One of those powers delegated to the military was the authority to direct its own tribunals separate from the authority exercised by Congress over the American people. Examining another dimension of Washington’s leadership, Beirne tells the gripping story of Benedict Arnold’s treasonous plot to surrender the American fortress at West Point, New York. In doing so, Beirne places the reader in the center of one of Washington’s most serious dilemmas. Overlapping and contradictory congressional and state laws, as well as international customs that determined “who were subject to military jurisdiction and who came under the cognizance of civil power,” created what Washington admitted was a “confused state.” Providing a historical overview of the origins, processes, and differences between courts martial and military November-December 2014  MILITARY REVIEW