Military Review English Edition November-December 2014 | Page 120

executed during the Civil War serves well to underscore this point. In one operation, Adm. David Dixon
Porter’s ships assisted Gen. Ulysses Grant’s capture of
Vicksburg on the Mississippi River.64 While the operations were not the result of a large, coordinated planning effort, they were eventually successful. Porter records that when Grant was asked how he was to get his
troop transports past the Vicksburg batteries, Grant’s
response was, “That is the admiral’s affair.”65 Of course
the episode is not a complete lesson in joint planning
as it is perhaps more of an anecdote about Grant’s droll
character. Nevertheless, Porter’s reflection serves as
interesting commentary on the faith one commander
had in another (service component) commander.
The faith demonstrated by Grant is no less important today. It is crucial to look outward at the team the
Army will join as the “indispensable partner” described
by the Army chief of staff.66 It is a safe assumption that
the Army will likely lead most joint task forces. So, it is
natural for Army leadership to consider what the other
services can do for the Army.
Solutions to the problems associated with the complex
environment described earlier, at first look, do not lend
themselves to other services. While there is no attempt
to belittle the other services, the solutions seem to call for
boots on the ground. The Navy’s off-shore presence and
the decentralized execution of the Air Force are not independent solutions, but rather parts of a solution. Central
to any solution is the role of the Army since it is most
likely to get tapped to wade into the complex land environment of an operation once senior political interests
are formed and clear end states (hopefully) are presented.
Receipt of the mission and end state is one thing,
but ge