Military Review English Edition May-June 2014 | Page 90
BOOK REVIEWS
of-fact in describing his job—he killed the enemy to
protect his fellow sailors, soldiers, and marines.
The book has shortcomings, though they are minor
and understandable. The author speaks little about
sniper tactics, techniques, and procedures for obvious reasons, yet discussion of these intricacies would
greatly interest most readers. Most descriptions are
generic. The unit made contact, an insurgent appeared,
and Kyle delivered the killing shot. There is little in
the way of psychology except for a short discussion
on the challenge of the first kill and how some snipers
experience slumps. Many readers might wonder why
a person would wish to be a sniper or what makes a
sniper different from other close combat warriors.
As for tactics, how does a sniper gain the edge when
dueling with an enemy sniper? Discussion of tactics
is minimal.
Kyle’s opinions on how recent wars have been
fought make the book interesting and relevant. Though
he does not belabor these points, he offers insight
into the mind of the warrior in direct contact with the
enemy. For example, he wholly disagreed with “putting an Iraqi face on the war,” claiming that the idea
was “garbage.” He believed that training the Iraqi
force while trying to win was preposterous, that the
United States should first win the war and then worry
about training the host-nation forces. Presumably, he
is not alone in that viewpoint.
Further, Kyle seemed to think little of winning
hearts and minds; he maintained that cooperation
occurred in Ramadi only after U.S. forces had killed
massive numbers of combatants. Once it was clear
U.S. forces “meant business,” the tribal leaders threw
out the insurgents and cooperated. Kyle suggests that
the United States could have killed its way to victory.
This is an interesting point and worthy of consideration. Many strategic leaders repeat the claim that such
an approach cannot succeed. Yet, if the soldiers on
the ground disagree, we have at a minimum a failure
to create shared understanding—a requirement for
successful mission command.
Despite the book’s limitations, Kyle tells an
interesting and important story. He is honest and
self-effacing, candidly discussing marital challenges,
the stress of his divided loyalty between family and
SEAL team, and his daughter’s health scare. His
point of view, one seen through a high-power scope
mounted on a .300 Winchester Magnum rifle, comes
across clearly. To use Chris Kyle’s famous motto,
88
“Despite what your mamma told you, violence does
solve problems.”
Lt. Col. Jim Varner, U.S. Army, Retired,
Platte City, Missouri
BROTHERS AT WAR:
The Unending Conflict in Korea
Sheila Miyoshi Jager, W.W. Norton and Company,
New York, 2013, 605 pages
F
UTURE HISTORIANS MAY one day recall
the Korean War as the world’s longest, strangest
conflict. In Brothers at War, Sheila Miyoshi Jager
recounts seven decades of bloodshed on the Korean
Peninsula. She begins with the brutal civil war that followed World War II and continues through the North
Korean invasion of 1950 and the three subsequent
years of open warfare. She concludes with the current
standoff between the brutal and unpredictable regime
in Pyongyang and its uneasy neighbors, most notably
the prosperous Republic of Korea.
The author, a professor of East Asian studies at
Oberlin College, focuses the first half of her study on
the devastating conflict between United Nations and
communist forces. Jager’s version briefly summarizes
the war’s key military actions. She incorporates keen
observations on the political and cultural aspects of the
war, particularly its waning U.S. support, the lengthy
and frustrating cease-fire negotiations, and the difficult
relationship between Korean premier Syngman Rhee
and his United Nations allies.
These are familiar topics to Western scholars and
history buffs. However, Jager also examines many
of the war’s less publicized issues, such as the plight
of South Korean civilians hastily drafted and thrown
into combat with U.S. units, the alleged war crimes by
both sides, the mistreatment of prisoners of war, and
the increasing role of South Korean military forces
during the course of the war.
Delegates finally agreed to a cease-fire in July 1953,
formally ending hostilities between communist and
United Nations forces on the Korean peninsula. As
Jager illustrates, the 60-year-old cease-fire has proven
anything but peaceful. Subsequent decades have been
marked by a seemingly endless series of bellicose and
occasionally bloody incursions by the North Korean
May-June 2014
MILITARY REVIEW