Military Review English Edition May-June 2014 | Page 88

BOOK REVIEWS

respected military historian and author of well-regarded
books on conventional warfare (such as March to the
Marne and The Path to Victory) and colonial warfare
(such as The Conquest of the Sahara and The French
Foreign Legion). However, he opens his newest book
by recalling a promising former student at the Naval
Postgraduate School who was killed in a “green-onblue” incident in Afghanistan, a war Porch describes
as a “murderous errand equipped with a counterfeit
doctrine that became the rage in 2007 following the
publication of FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency.” Clearly,
Porch is not a fan of counterinsurgency doctrine and its
modern evangelists. Nor does he make his case in the
nuanced, cautious tone of most academic scholarship.
The narrative presents a series of case studies
going back to the 18th century. The focus is on the
experiences of the British, French, and U.S. militaries, starting with France’s ruthless suppression of the
royalist revolt in the Vendée in 1793, and extending up
to the current war in Afghanistan. From these cases,
he argues that the whole concept of “small wars” and
counterinsurgency is based on a mythology produced
“by shoddy research and flawed, selective analysis
of cases.” From the false claims of French colonial
officers who conquered Algeria in the 19th century,
to the “triumphalism” of those who, like Tom Ricks,
celebrated the “surge” in Iraq in 2007, the historical
record has been pillaged and perverted to use counterinsurgency as a toolbox of surefire techniques to spread
the benefits of Western culture, wealth, and political
values. In Porch’s view, such history is either foolish
self-delusion or outright deceit.
Not surprisingly, Porch gives special attention to
well-known 20th century insurgencies such as the
unhappy French experience in Algeria, the uncertain
British approach to Northern Ireland, and the U.S.
failure in Vietnam. In these cases and many others,
Porch discovers a familiar pattern—apparent success at the tactical level tended to disguise strategic
failures. Moreover, all too frequently, a “hearts and
minds” approach served as a smokescreen for extralegal brutality. Even the British and their reputation
for skill in “aid to civil authority” proved, in Porch’s
view, incapable of real institutional learning, with
their muddled efforts in southern Iraq providing the
most recent evidence. The narrative makes for grim
reading, salted with occasional flashes of humor. T.
E. Lawrence, for example, is mocked as “Dances
with Camels.”
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The deeper one gets into the book, the more Porch’s
style descends from historical analysis to a sort of rant.
By the time he turns his attention to the war in Iraq,
his attacks extend beyond past proponents of counterinsurgency to denunciations of hero-worshipping
journalists, religious fundamentalists, neo-imperialists, stupid Army generals, and even fellow faculty
members at the Naval Postgraduate School. At one
point, he even resorts to using “The Daily Show”
as a footnote. Very odd. Nevertheless, the book has
made its way onto the Chief of Staff of the Army’s
new professional reading list. I G2