Military Review English Edition May-June 2014 | Page 70

have included improving the
ability of the host nations to
contain insurgencies effectively while U.S. military
influence in planning and
execution waned. 29 This
transition from open insurgency to normal political
and economic life was the
goal in each plan, the same
as Iraq and Afghanistan.
However, the evidence indicates that while the military
is the best instrument to provide immediate, stabilizing
security, the introduction of
more military units tends to
aggravate the population,
driving more into insurgent
activities. During these successful COIN campaigns,
the interagency process
worked to ensure that the
military operations did not
crowd out the political and
economic work that was the
fundamental key to success.
Sgt. Jordano Hernandez, Company A, 163rd Military Intelligence Battalion, 504th Battlefield
These “whole-country”
Surveillance Brigade, speaks with members of the Afghan Border Police before attacking a
plans were developed relapossible weapons cache site during Operation Southern Strike II near Yaro Kalay, Afghanistan,
4 June 2012. (U.S. Army, Sgt. Brendan Mackie)
tively early in the campaign.
In all three countries, immediate military assistance
from the U.S. task forces sought to stabilize bat- deployments of direct combat forces. Myriad
tered host-nation security forces. Military support tools and authorities that fall under theater secuconcentrated on weapons and tactics training. rity cooperation will allow robust and persistent
There was no attempt to transform the society, as engagement. Experiences in El Salvador, Colomwas the case in Afghanistan with the International bia, and the Philippines illustrate three ongoing
Security Assistance Force’s focus on governance constraints that need not impair effectiveness:
Congressionally mandated constraints on
and development.
military activities. Far from causing problems
while assisting partners, congressional guidance
Conclusion
The Joint Force 2020 concept identifies a future in the form of policies and laws actually serve to
security environment in which armed conflict will clarify the working relationships between the milibe inevitable and enduring.30 As they always have, tary services and the rest of the U.S. government.
irreconcilable wills continue trying to dominate Occasional hearings and mandated reports ensure
each other through violence. When the United that the ultimate arbiter of foreign policy—the
States responds to conflict, its approach needs to American public—supports military involvement.
Force caps. Mandating upper limits on the
account for political and fiscal constraints. This
means working with partners and avoiding large deployments of personnel forces headquarters
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May-June 2014

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