Military Review English Edition March-April 2016 | Page 97

RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON

Offset
Drop Zone

15 –

Lodgment
20 k
m

S

Figure. Joint Forcible Entry by Airborne Assault, with the Reconnaissance
Squadron Inserted on an Offset Drop Zone to Create a Screen Line
strength. In this way, it improves the commander’s ability to avoid concentrations of enemy forces.
While infantry battalions are organized, equipped,
and trained for the close-in fight necessary to control a
lodgment and prepare it for follow-on forces, the reconnaissance squadron is designed to operate within and
behind enemy lines without becoming decisively engaged.
During the assault phase, the infantry battalions will be, by
necessity, focused on terrain. Conversely, a reconnaissance
squadron will not be concerned with controlling terrain
but rather with providing timely and accurate reporting
for the joint force commander. To achieve this, while the
main assault force masses on the lodgment, the reconnaissance squadron can insert on an offset drop zone simultaneously but outside the lodgment itself.
This course of action, depicted graphically in the
figure, would require two coordinated airborne assaults.
Forcible entry “may include linkup and exploitation by
ground maneuver from a separate location,” an option
that provides the ground force commander with several
benefits.16 By inserting the reconnaissance squadron
onto a separate drop zone, the joint force commander
enables the squadron to develop the situation beyond the
lodgment so the joint force can achieve significant effects
on enemy forces.
Because a reconnaissance squadron can operate
independently from the actions on the lodgment,
the enemy may feel compelled to shift part of its
MILITARY REVIEW  March-April 2016

“attention and effort away from actual assault
objectives.” 17 The enemy then would be forced to
choose between massing combat power against the
actual lodgment and confronting the possibility of
an additional lodgment being created by the squadron’s assault onto an offset drop zone—terrain the
squadron would never intend to hold. The result
would be that the enemy could not “mass decisive
force to deny joint force assaults.”18 Meanwhile, as
the enemy attempted to fix and finish the reconnaissance squadron—a challenging task given its
design—the squadron would continue to provide
timely information on enemy maneuvers without
becoming decisively engaged.

Information Dominance
It is during the assault phase that information dominance is most critical to a commander’s decision-making process. As the joint force is most vulnerable during
this phase, “effective indications and warnings, targeting
support, and collection management of ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] assets to track
enemy reaction to the assault and force protection are
paramount concerns.”19 While these concerns represent
considerable risks during the most critical phase of the
operation, they can also be mitigated through employment of the reconnaissance squadron in a manner consistent with Army and joint doctrine. When properly
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