Military Review English Edition March-April 2016 - Page 68

growth, USAID and DOS solidified the governance relationships that were identified by the CA team.30 While the CMSE was able to gain access into the FATA and expand DOS support to governance, their actions were intended to support SOF objectives. The Special Operations Command (Forward)-Pakistan commander stated that the CA team’s ability to gain access into a targeted region was the most significant capability that they possessed. However, the value to the commander was magnified when they utilized the access gained to identify the source of the insurgent growth, and develop DOS supported governance programs. The CME proved extremely capable of meeting their obligations.31 In 2010, a nongovernmental study conducted by the New America Foundation outlined the U.S. and Pakistani responses to insurgent activities in the FATA.32 The responses include the actions taken by SOF, which are identified in the study as counterinsurgency programs. The most interesting aspect of this study is a survey conducted in the FATA region. This is the first time a survey was conducted in that area and it focused on identifying local perceptions of the United States, Pakistani governance, insurgent groups, corruption, and the judicial system. The results showed that while the SOF programs were initially effective, it was ultimately the governance infrastructure and reforms that led to increased governance in the FATA. The reforms, which began in 2009, allowed secular political parties to compete in Pakistani elections, thus increasing political participation, and reform in the judicial processes that the local militias perceived to be unfair. The CME in Pakistan was very valuable to SOF, and similar programs could provide similar value to FORSCOM and GCC commanders. Their value was initially confined to gaining access into the FATA by providing essential services. This access—considered a vital capability—was possessed only by the CA unit and supported several SOF objectives. It enabled the identification and targeting of the insurgent networks, and allowed the SOF element to conduct FID with the local militias and the Frontier Corps, the acting government. Those were tactical and operational successes that led to the accomplishment of strategic objectives when the team enabled the Pakistani government to expand into the FATA region, evidenced by the independent, non-USG study. The Pakistan mission provides a great 66 example of how the CME program provided a critical capability to achieve both SOF and DOS objectives. Sri Lanka A similar example of the effectiveness of the CME program is found in the mission to Sri Lanka. In 2009, Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa declared victory over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. However, while the Tamil insurgency may have gone underground in the short term, without addressing the root causes of conflict, the possibility fo r long-term violence remains. The Sri Lankan government still lacks a clear political ability to stabilize the country and enhance government legitimacy.33 The lack of legitimacy facilitates the many pockets of undergoverned territories in Sri Lanka. Despite the occupation by Sri Lankan military and an increasing presence of Sinhalese in the north, the Tamil minority feel that “Jaffna is being invaded by Sinhalese. We are losing our culture.”34 Continued media censorship, illegal detention, and human rights abuses inhibit the freedom of Tamil citizens. The Sri Lankan government is working to decrease its military presence with tangible improvements to Tamil’s populated regions. This often occurs in the form of infrastructure development, increased economic aid, and inclusionary measures designed to increase Tamil participation in both local and national governance. Without government implemented nonmilitary measures, the Tamil insurgency is likely to remain dormant, only waiting for the right opportunity to reemerge.35 The CMSE in Sri Lanka understood the strategic importance of their mission in Sri Lanka, and being able to consistently synchronize SOF and DOS activities. The training and education of the CMSE in Sri Lanka, along with the Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC) directives ensured they understood the Title 22 environment. Their program synchronization and unity of effort built trust with the ambassador and DOS contingent. The CMSE was able to demonstrate their value by ensuring that each of the SOF programs directly supported a DOS or USAID program. As a result, the ambassador expanded the SOF element operating in Sri Lanka, thus increasing SOF capability to successfully combat the extremist organizations.36 The Sri Lanka mission has endured for over five years and is quickly becoming a mature mission in one of SOCPAC’s priority regions.37 March-April 2016  MILITARY REVIEW