Military Review English Edition March-April 2016 - Page 65

CIVIL-MILITARY ENGAGEMENT Army strategy to counter those threats, suggests that the regionally aligned forces require a capability to synchronize DOD and DOS activities. This capability does not currently exist programmatically; commanders must either possess the ability to synchronize objectives, or they require an organization with this capability working for them. Based on the nature of security cooperation, these (Photo by Pfc. Roy Mercon, 172nd Cavalry Regiment PAO) regionally aligned mission Capt. Terrance McIntosh, a civil affairs officer from Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 1st Squadron, sets are likely to take place 172nd Cavalry Regiment, distributes supplies during a humanitarian aid mission 25 August 2010 in the in Phase 0 (Shape) environ- village of Bashikal in Parwan Province, Pakistan. The village was affected by damaging floods, and the aid included bags of rice and cooking oil. ments.14 This environment is commonly referred to as a Title 22 zone, which signifies insurgent abilities to spread that ideology, while synthat the DOS and the U.S. ambassador assumes the lead chronizing DOS and SOF activities, and emphasizing for promoting U.S. interests, and the DOD is the supengagements and relationship building. porting organization.15 As the U.S. Army seeks to become USSOCOM Directive 525-38 formalized the regionally engaged, in order to deter threats derived from CME program in 2014 (which had been in execution undergoverned areas, it appears critical that DOD objecfor several years) and provided program direction. tives remain nested within the DOS strategic plans. CMSE’s are scalable, modular, and they deploy at the request of a combatant commander, a chief of misOptimal Solution sion, or a TSOC in support of theater campaign plans. In 2013, then commander of U.S. Special Operations Unlike the Army-funded Major Force Program 2 Command (USSOCOM ), Adm. William McRaven, (MFP-2), which supports conventional forces, CME presented Congress with a SOF capability that focused is a baseline MFP-11 program that supports SOF on preventing the emergence of conflict by projectforces. However, if adopted by FORSCOM and funding governance into undergoverned areas. He stated, ed through MFP-2, the core activities of CME could “through civil-military support elements (CMSE) and enhance the FORSCOM mission.17 support to public diplomacy, SOF directly supports The core activities of CME are population-centric interagency efforts to counter violent extremist ideology within a specific country, region, or area of interest. and diminish the drivers of violence that al-Qaida and Core CME activities include: other terrorists exploit.”16 McRaven went on to describe 1. Gain and maintain access to areas of interest. CMSE efforts that help prevent terrorist radicalization, 2. Establish enduring relationships and networks recruitment, and mobilization. The CMSE is the elewith populations and key stakeholders. ment of the CME program of record, executed by civil 3. Address critical civil vulnerabilities, which could affairs (CA) soldiers. These elements provide commandbe exploited by destabilizing factors or groups. ers with a valuable way of accomplishing DOD objec4. Plan, coordinate, facilitate, and execute SOF spetives in a Title 22 environment. CMSE efforts are percific programs, operations, and activities, synchronizing sistent and differ from traditional military campaigns by short-to-midterm objectives with mid- to long-term proactively identifying insurgent ideology and mitigating U.S. government (USG) objectives. MILITARY REVIEW  March-April 2016 63