Military Review English Edition March-April 2016 - Page 43

COMPLEX WORLD Notes 1. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet (TP) 525-3-1, The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Winning in a Complex World 2020-2040 (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 31 October 2014), iii, accessed 2 October 2015, http://www.tradoc.army.mil/ tpubs/pams/tp525-3-1.pdf. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid., 19 and 31. 4. Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 2-01.3, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], November 2014), 1-1, accessed 2 October 2015, http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/ DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/atp2_01x3.pdf. 5. Horst W. J. Rittel, “On the Planning Crisis: Systems Analysis of the ‘First and Second Generations,’” Bedriftsøkonomen 8 (1972), 392–393; TP 525-5-500, The United States Army Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 28 January 2008). Originally coined by Rittel, the term “wicked problems” is used here as defined in TP 525-5-500 as problems that are ill-structured, complex, nonlinear, and chaotic. 6. Karl R. Popper, Of Clouds and Clocks: An Approach to the Problem of Rationality and the Freedom of Man, 1972, The Rathouse website, accessed 2 October 2015, http://www.the-rathouse.com/2011/ Clouds-and-Clocks.html. 7. Carl von Clausewitz, Principles of War, trans. and ed. Hans W. Gatzke (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2003), 19; Dietrich Dörmer, The Logic of Failure, Recognizing and Avoiding Error in Complex Situations (Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books, 1996), 170; U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies, The Art of Design, Student Text, version 2.0. 2011, 48, MILITARY REVIEW  March-April 2016 accessed 2 October 2015, http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/CGSC/ events/sams/ArtofDesign_v2.pdf. 8. Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference (New York: Back Bay Books, 2002), 160. 9. Grant Martin, “Deniers of ‘the Truth’: Why an Agnostic Approach to Warfare is Key,” Military Review ( January–February 2015): 42, accessed 2 October 2015, http://www.joomag. com/magazine/military-review-english-edition-january-february-2015/0458792001419375392. 10. ATP 2-01.3, Intelligence Preparation, 1-1. 11. Brigham J. Mann, Systemic Thinking: Enhancing Intelligence Preparation and Estimates, Naval War College paper, 30 April 2010, accessed 2 October 2015, http://dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a525138.pdf. 12. Scott Stanford, “Enemies Wanted: No Experience Necessary The Army’s Addiction to Enemies Inhibits Analysis of the Operational Environment,” Small Wars Journal, 1 April 2015, accessed 2 October 2015, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/ enemies-wanted-no-experience-necessary-the-army%E2%80%99s-addiction-to-enemies-inhibits-analysis-of. 13. Martin, “Deniers,” 44. 14. Ibid., 50. 15. Ibid. 16. Peter Checkland, Systems Thinking, Systems Practice: Includes a 30-Year Retrospective (New York: Wiley, 1999), A16. “Rich Picture” is a soft systems methodology concept for developing deep understanding of ill-structured/complex problems by going through the process of drawing extremely detailed pictures, which enhances understanding of the environment and problem. 17. Mann, Systemic Thinking, 13. 41