Military Review English Edition March-April 2016 | Page 127

BOOK REVIEWS

the Eastern Front
since Norman Stone’s
(no relation) The
Eastern Front, published in 1975.
The Russian Army
benefits from work
done in the Russian
archives, as well as the
deeper understandings
of Russian civil and
military society, possible only after the Cold
War. Stone’s main
argument is an important one—despite staggering defeats, setbacks, and
waning public support, the Russian Empire collapsed
from the inside. The Russian Imperial Army remained
in the field and, surprisingly, effective until 1917, when
political disintegration in Saint Petersburg and elsewhere destroyed it. Stone also provides vital context
and corrections for several common mischaracterizations about the Russian, as well as Austro-Hungarian
and German, experiences of the Great War.
On the rare occasion that most people think about
World War I’s Eastern Front, the Russian losses at
Tannenberg, and finally, the peace treaty at BrestLitovsk, all paint a simple narrative of failure.
While the Russians certainly struggled to counter
the material and tactical superiority of the German
army, they did have successes—usually against
the Austrians and the Ottomans. The 1914 loss at
Tannenberg was counterbalanced by major Russian
victories in Austrian Galicia, including the capture of
Lviv, Austria-Hungary’s fourth largest city. Even after
the devastating effects of the Great Retreat in 1915, the
Russian army conducted major offensives in every year
of the war, including a 1916 offensive led by Aleksei
Brusilov—this was one of the most effective tactical
performances of any army during the war.
Russia clearly lost in World War I, but Stone