Military Review English Edition March-April 2015 | Page 99

IGNORANT COUNTERINSURGENT (Photo by Spc. Zachary Burke, AFN BENELUX) Lt. Col. Darrin C. Ricketts, deputy commander of 4th Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, along with Lt. Col. Donn H. Hill, commander of Task Force White Currahee, 2nd Battalion, 506th Infantry Regiment, 4th BCT, 101st Abn. Div., and U.S. Army Brig. Gen. John Uberti, deputy commanding general of Afghan Development, 101st Abn. Div., speaks with an Afghan National Army commander for Naka District, Afghanistan, during Operation Overlord, 14 April 2011. violence for societal, economic, and political ends is hardly comparable to teaching French to a class of Flemish students, teaching counterinsurgency (through security force assistance) from the Western perspective currently revolves around the classical teacher-student relationship. We see ourselves as the teachers, and when we go to any country in the world that we believe requires counterinsurgency assistance, we teach their forces how we believe they should conduct security, military, and paramilitary operations to meet our foreign policy goals.8 This foundational concept of pedagogy is so ingrained into our profession that it takes some effort to even recognize it and reflect on it. This makes an epistemological discussion of counterinsurgency rather awkward. We tend to think about concrete teaching and counterinsurgency methods instead of the bigger picture—the values we hold as a group, especially those related to how we conceive of teaching.9 Rancière argues that nearly all Western approaches to conveying or discovering knowledge are shackled to a strict and unequal partnership between the teacher and the student, which he terms the old ma ster MILITARY REVIEW  March-April 2015 relationship.10 In this model, knowledge is administered hierarchically. The master does more than simply giving the information (such as a book) to the students and telling them to learn it. The master attempts to control the learning process, by measuring progress, evaluating students, explaining information at times, and withholding information at other times if the students are not ready for a given level of advancement. Jacotot called this explication, which reduces the independence of students by forcing them into complete dependence upon the master.11 The military education system extensively employs this very way of teaching from cadet training and university through a military career up to the senior levels of war colleges. No surprise, it also is how U.S. forces seek to transfer knowledge when advising host-nation forces, in a manner that presumes a relationship of nonequals.12 One practical consequence of this old master relationship, in terms of pedagogy, is that it erects and maintains a distance between teachers and the students, “a distance discursively invented and reinvented 97