Military Review English Edition March-April 2015 | Page 74

Soldiers need to understand the principles of jus in
bello because they can help clarify moral reasoning. Jus
in bello dominates other paradigms of moral justification for actions in war. When understood and applied,
it dissipates much of the fog of war by guiding when the
taking of life is appropriate and when it is not. The rest
of this discussion focuses on applying jus in bello at the
tactical level.

Jus in Bello
Jus in bello, in its simplest form, can be broken
down into two concepts: distinction and proportionality. Distinction concerns distinguishing between noncombatants (friendly and soldiers and civilians who are
not actively involved in combat, so they are posing no
threat) and combatants (all who are involved actively
in combat). Civilians not participating in combat are,
morally, immune from attack, although some could
be injured or killed unintentionally in what is termed
“collateral damage.” Prisoners are not combatants and
should be safeguarded from attack. Proportionality
concerns soldiers using only the amount of force necessary to meet the task, but no more. Both of these concepts are designed to limit the destruction of warfare.
While these concepts seem simple and straightforward, their application can be far more complicated.
What really constitutes a combatant? Sometimes this
is easily determined by the uniforms combatants wear.
Yet, in irregular warfare, clear identification of an
enemy may sometimes only be made when that enemy
is firing a weapon. Furthermore, how can a person’s
participation in warfare be ascertained? If civilians are
manufacturing arms and equipment for the enemy, do
they become lawful targets? These types of difficult
questions illustrate the fog of war.
Soldiers struggle internally with a number of competing values in the fog of war, weighing the expediency
of mission objectives and the cost of victory against
actions they believe to be morally right. Overpowering
emotions such as anger, grief, and revenge complicate
their decision making. Moral codes of the profession
of arms, the law of war, and the rules of engagement,
although helpful, often are inadequate in the chaotic
situations of war. Factoring in the relatively young
average age of a soldier in combat and the limited time
available for making a decision, the difficulty of moral
decisions in war becomes evident.
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At least jus in bello, through the concepts of distinction and proportionality, provi des a baseline for determining the actions that would be moral. For example,
it is clear that a civilian—even a citizen of an enemy
state—who is not an immediate participant in combat,
is an unlawful target. Similarly, it is clear that destroying an entire town to kill a few enemy combatants is
morally wrong. There is a baseline, a point of reference
from which to decide.
The U.S. Army as an institution is not blind to
the difficulty of these situations, and it does not want
command authority preempted by legalities. Army
Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22, Army
Leadership, tasks commanders, officers, and other
leaders to apply ethical reasoning to different situations using character traits and beliefs developed in the
individual when the rules of engagement and law of
armed conflict prove insufficient.9 Therefore, there is a
place for value judgments. The Army puts its full faith
in the moral judgment of its leaders on the battlefield.10
However, to understand moral decisions in combat, one
must also understand the community of the warrior.

The Warrior Society and Moral
Leadership
Personal survival on the battlefield is a group effort.
Individual ethics and adherence to principles of jus in
bello are played out within the context of the group,
within a society of warriors. A soldier belongs to concentric circles of groups, from team, squad, platoon, and
company, to battalion, brigade, division, and even higher.
The group dynamic is paramount to survival, and soldiers fight in the smallest of these warrior society groups.
Not all are equal within the group; some hold status
because of rank, technical skill, or strong personality. Nevertheless, the fear of losing one’s reputation in
these groups because of moral lapses, lack of courage,
or ineptitude during the fight can be a stronger motivator than avoiding losing one’s life.11 These thoughts
are echoed by Albert Bandura in his social cognitive
theory, where he states,
People do not operate as autonomous moral
agents impervious to the social realities in
which they are immersed. Moral agency is socially situated and exercised in particularized
ways depending on the life conditions under
which people transact their affairs.12
March-April 2015  MILITARY REVIEW