Military Review English Edition March-April 2015 | Page 52

and conduct is further exemplified by the numbers
of troops missing in action from each war. More than
19,000 ground troops remain missing from World War
II, more than 7,500 remain missing from the Korean
War, and 1,600 are still unaccounted for from Vietnam,
while only one was listed as “missing-captured” in
Afghanistan.17 Full-spectrum war against nation-states
is more fluid and more austere than counterinsurgency.
Just as we remain prepared for an unlikely nuclear
conflict, personnel policy assignments must be developed for the worst-case scenario of full-scale war
against a nation-state, such as North Korea or Iran (or
unforeseen crises such as Ukraine), rather than the
limited war found in counterinsurgency operations.
In war against a nation-state, we must prepare for the
conscription of troops and offensive combat operations
in a field environment for prolonged periods of time.
The optimal demographic. Sound public policy
requires the wise and prudent use of money, time, and
assets. Our policies for military personnel assignment
must be suitable for present conflicts as well as when
time is of the essence in full-spectrum conflict conscription. Unless we are prepared to incur the costs associated with inducting and evaluating every American
for infantry service, regardless of condition, some
selection parameters must be established. Accordingly,
we must seek the demographic group most reasonably
calculated to effect success on the full-scale conflict
infantry battlefield. Thus far, the optimal demographic group for infantry service has proven to be young,
healthy males. At issue here is the demographic of
women. However, the rationale set forth below is not
limited to women. It is equally applicable to other demographic groups, such as middle-aged men.
The physical requirements of infantry combat.
The physical requirements of combat push men to the
extreme. Grasping this fundamental aspect of combat
is imperative, and we cannot begin to develop sound
personnel policies until that is understood. Overall,
there are two components of physical requirements for
infantry service. The first is the component of strength,
speed, stamina, and agility.18 The second is the capacity
to sustain those physical abilities through the catabolic
stress of extended combat operations.19
The need for strength, speed, stamina, and agility is
evidenced through various infantry combat tasks, such
as digging fighting trenches, handling heavy equipment,
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enduring load-bearing marches, and transporting
casualties under fire.20 The ability to perform some of
these tasks is calculated by the Marine Corps Combat
Fitness Test (CFT), which measures lifting, running,
maneuvering under fire, grenade throwing, and carrying equipment and casualties.21
The Naval Health Research Center studied 2,000
Marine Corps CFT participants. That study reports
that gender had a significant effect on test performance.22 Even when wearing heavy and cumbersome
personal protective equipment (e.g., flak jackets),
males (mostly ages 17 to 26) scored significantly
higher than the females (mostly ages 17 to 26) who
did not wear such equipment.23 Gender disparities
in upper body strength were later shown when 55
percent of Marine female recruits could not perform
three pull-ups by the end of boot camp, while the
failure rate for male recruits was 1 percent.24 These
results are consistent with the fact that males have
more muscle mass than females, with 50 percent
more upper body strength and one-third greater
lower body strength.25
March-April 2015  MILITARY REVIEW