Military Review English Edition March-April 2015 | Page 134

on the border, while the interior of France remained
unscathed by war. The second promises that the era of
protracted land conflicts is over, and that America will
remain untouched by war. While there is a tendency in
defense studies to repeat assertions to the point they gain
general acceptance, history’s rejoinder is reality—the stuff
debacles are made of.
The major flaw of the Maginot Line was not in its
construction but in French policy decisions, which eroded
military readiness to the point that France’s army became
a hollow force. Hitler’s early probing revealed the deplorable state of France’s military, nullifying the deterrent value of the demilitarized Rhineland and the alliances with
Czechoslovakia and Poland. During the defense of France,
the Maginot Line did permit the French army to conduct
an economy of force along the German border in order
for the army, along with the British and Belgian forces, to
achieve sufficient mass in Belgium. Untested, untrained,

and outclassed, the Allied armies collapsed at first contact
and never recovered during the campaign for France.
Despite protestations to the contrary, proponents of
ASB are promoting a gimmick that seeks to obviate the
necessity of protracted land warfare. Like the Maginot
Line concept, once policy makers commit to it, the result
will be a gross imbalance of U.S. military forces. The
atrophy of U.S. land power may not become apparent for
years, but the rot will be absolute. Ancillary capabilities—
stability operations, humanitarian assistance, and disaster
response—will slough off; next, logistical and combat
support capabilities will attenuate; finally, land forces will
be expected to perform missions as in the past but will
suffer egregious losses as mounting deficiencies manifest.
As with all ideas that sound cogent at cocktail parties, there is always the hangover to contend with the
next morning. U.S. policy makers need to be skeptical—very skeptical.

Lt. Col. Raymond Millen, U.S. Army, retired, is the professor of security sector reform at the Peacekeeping and
Stability Operations Institute, Carlisle, Pa. He holds an M.A. in national security studies from Georgetown
University and an M.A. in world politics from Catholic University of America. He is pursuing a Ph.D. in political
science from Catholic University of America. He served three tours in Afghanistan and has published several books
and articles on NATO, counterinsurgency, Afghanistan, and security-sector reform issues.

Notes
1. U.S. Department of Defense, Air-Sea Battle: Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access & Area Denial Challenges
(Washington DC: Air-Sea Battle Office, 12 May 2013), 1-2, http://
www.defense.gov/pubs/ASB-ConceptImplementation-Summary-May-2013.pdf (accessed 6 November 2014).
2. Ibid., 2.
3. Ibid., 4-5, 7.
4. Ibid., 7-9.
5. Norton A. Schwartz and Jonathan W. Greenert, “Air-Sea
Battle,” The American Interest website, 20 February 2012, http://
www.the-american-interest.com/articles/2012/02/20/air-sea-battle/
(accessed 6 November 2014).
6. The Transportation Plan, operationalized from March to
June 1944, was designed to prevent the Germans from rushing
reinforcements to the Normandy beachhead. As such, air power
isolated the Normandy area by targeting select urban and rail
centers, bridges, and other transportation nodes.
7. The Dyle Plan envisioned a joint British-French movement
into Belgium once the German offensive began. The strategy
served two purposes: first, to shorten the front along good
defensive terrain; and second, to ensure French territory was not

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subjected to the same type of devastation as suffered during
World War I.
8. The European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan) was
designed to assist in the reconstruction of Europe and to restore
confidence in the European people. Marshall believed that the
restoration of European economies would create greater political
stability, thereby countering the allure of Soviet socialism. Funding
of $13 billion resulted in a rejuvenation of European industrialization, increased corporate investments, stimulation of the
U.S. economy, and increased trade between North America and
Europe. Ultimately, the goal was economic integration and political
unification of Europe.
9. Tyrone C. Marshall Jr., “Pentagon Official Explains Asia-Pacific Focus,” U.S. Department of Defense News, http://www.defense.
gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=117989 (accessed 16 January
2015). The pivot to the Pacific Rim implies a shift in U.S. strategic
priorities and resources. In view of the importance of Asian trade
and markets to U.S. economic interests, the pivot would assure
these markets remain secure from instability or aggression. In view
of the vast sea areas, air and sea power would serve as the logical
services to this end.

March-April 2015  MILITARY REVIEW