Military Review English Edition March-April 2015 | Page 13

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

(Photo by Spc. Ken Scar, 7th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment)

Members of the Afghan Uniformed Police, Naka District, including the local chief of police, point out an enemy combatant they have
spotted on the ridgeline about 500 meters away to Brig. Gen. Gary Volesky, deputy commanding general–maneuver, 1st Cavalry Division,
and members of Company B, Task Force 2-28, 172nd Infantry Brigade, 20 September 2013.

nor a MacArthuresque lifting of restrictions on the
amount of force applied. Rarely will winning be as
simple as tracking the advance of forces across a
map. What winning does require is a rational determination to achieve a sustainable outcome, usually a
political outcome, consistent with vital interests.
In late 2001, the Taliban regime collapsed, in
large measure because every Afghan was convinced
of the inevitability of their defeat. The Taliban
regenerated after 2004, not only because they were
able to receive support from al-Qaida and foreign intelligence organizations in support bases in Pakistan,
but also because they sowed doubts in the minds
of Afghans, especially those in the south and east,
about the Afghan government’s and the coalition’s
ability and willingness to prevent their return. At
times, in both Afghanistan and Iraq, doubts about
U.S. and partner willingness to consolidate gains
and sustain commitments for ample duration and in
MILITARY REVIEW  March-April 2015

sufficient scale to win not only encouraged enemies
but also sowed doubts among friends and neutrals.
Winning in war, of course, is not a military-only task. Achieving sustainable outcomes consistent
with vital interests is an inherently civil-military
task that requires integrated planning and execution of political, diplomatic, military, economic,
informational, intelligence, and, increasingly, law
enforcement and rule of law efforts. The AOC
highlights the Army’s role in providing foundational
capabilities that permit the United States to project
national power and “help integrate and synchronize
the efforts of multiple partners.”12
To cope with what Clausewitz described as the
blind natural forces of “violence, hatred, and enmity”
that challenge the will, professionalism, and moral
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