Military Review English Edition March-April 2015 | Page 118

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Would empowerment of the group come
at the expense of any host government entity—
whether sovereign, transitional, or provisional—
with which the United States has equities? How
would we manage our relations with such a government entity?
Does the host government have the capability
and wil l to support the program, or at least not undermine it?
Would the act of empowering the group be a
tacit admission that some other U.S. goal for national
sovereignty had failed? How would the program be
reconciled with stated U.S. goals?
Would the proposed program also require funds
for reconstruction and civil affairs?
Is the need for the program so dire that the
United States is willing to work with people who may
have poor human rights records and to defend the
program from oversight and criticism?
If the group is intended to counter al-Qaida or
its affiliates, has al-Qaida misplayed its hand in some
way that can be exploited?

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What are the de-escalation and transition
plans in anticipation of the short-term objectives
being met?
What is the recovery plan in the event that the
United States would supply the group with resources
that may have to be accounted for later?

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Conclusion
The above may or may not be relevant to a given
case, and the answers need not demonstrate that a proposed program look like the Anbar Awakening. Where
circumstances differ with the Awakening, we can ask
why—and ask how we can tailor the program to the local
reality. Doing so will confront each challenge as a product of its own locale and circumstance and may determine that an Awakening-like program may or may not
be suitable. However, at a minimum, appreciation for the
Anbar Awakening’s context will assist the understanding
of a major event in the history of recent warfare, counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency. As a result, it will
likely be a subject of continued debate—and seemingly
influence—in the years and decades to come.

Dr. Matthew T. Penney was a member of the Center for the Study of Intelligence history staff from 2008 to 2014.
He holds a B.A. and M.A. from Baylor University and a Ph.D. in history from Rice University. Dr. Penney’s
areas of concentration are the Middle East, counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency.

Notes
1. William Knarr, “Al-Sahawa: An Awakening in Al Qaim,”
Global ECCO, CTX 3 (2)(May 2013), https://globalecco.org/
al-sahawa-an-awakening-in-al-qaim (accessed 20 November
2014). This article uses the term “Sahawa” throughout, for
ease. The movement, which had existed in disparate factions
for several months, coalesced into the Anbar Tribal Sheiks
Council in August 2006, went public in September 2006 as the
Emergency Council for the Rescue of Al Anbar, and changed
its name to Sahawa al-Anbar in November 2006. In February
2007, its leaders began referring to it as Sahawa al-Iraq, a name
formalized that April.
2. Some of the more notable works that deal with the Awakening include David Kilcullen, Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting
Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (London: Oxford University Press, 2009), 115–85; Timothy S. McWilliams and Curtis P.
Wheeler, eds., Al Anbar Awakening Volumes I and II, (Quantico,
VA: Marine Corps University, 2009); Linda Robinson, Tell Me
How this Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search for a Way
out of Iraq (New York: Public Affairs, 2008).
116

3. Neil Smith and Sean MacFarland, “Anbar Awakens: The
Tipping Point,” Military Review (March–April 2008): 41–52; Bing
West, The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in
Iraq (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008); “Interview with Sheik
Sabah,” in McWilliams and Wheeler, Volume II, 139-47.
4. Smith and MacFarland, 41-52; See also Todd Pitman,
“Sunni Sheiks Join Fight vs. Insurgency,” Associated Press, 25
March 2007.
5. McWilliams and Wheeler, Volume II , 111-112, 135;
Kathleen Ridolfo, “Sunni Groups Vie For Control of Western
Region,” Iraq Report: February 21, 2008, Radio Free Europe/
Radio Liberty website, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1347743.html (accessed 10 February 2015); Smith and
MacFarland, 46-47.
6. Jim Michaels, A Chance in Hell: The Men Who Triumphed
over Iraq’s Deadliest City and Turned the Tide of War (New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 2010), 95-98; Rafid Fadhil Ali, “Sunni
Rivalries in al-Anbar Province Threaten Iraq’s Security,” Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Focus 5(10)(11 March 2008), http://
March-April 2015  MILITARY REVIEW