Military Review English Edition March-April 2014 | Page 32

only one article has appeared in either journal on
the topic.1
Taken at face value, this could suggest a growing
gap between what senior Army leaders are saying
about the institution’s priorities and where the rest
of the institution is focusing its intellectual energy
and thought. Could it be that the secretary of the
Army and chief of staff’s message just is not resonating—that the rest of the Army thinks the institution’s top priority should lie elsewhere? Certainly.
But history has shown that innovation happens
mainly at the grass-roots level, and, undoubtedly,
units are identifying smart, effective initiatives at
the local level—initiatives that are not being shared
as widely as other best practices that more directly
relate to warfighting functions.
This article challenges Army leaders at the levels
of brigade and below to more vocally share lessons
learned in the campaign to eliminate sexual assault
and harassment. It offers three simple considerations for leaders as they continue to implement
the SHARP program at the unit level.

Build Ownership—of the
Problem and its Solutions
If Clemenceau was right that war is too important
to be left to the generals, then a similar statement
can be made about SHARP: it is too important to
be left to our sexual assault response coordinators
(SARCs) and unit victim advocates (UVAs). Yet,
this is largely what we have done—delegated our
SHARP training to well-intentioned SARCs or
UVAs who lead us through three-hour PowerPoint
presentations directed by Headquarters, Department
of the Army.2 While such centralized training probably has helped increase awareness of reporting and
response procedures, it has done little in terms of
establishing ownership at the unit level or helping
prevent incidents of harassment and assault.
First and foremost, SHARP must be a commander’s program. While SARCs and UVAs are
invaluable enablers, commanders must own and
direct SHARP