Military Review English Edition July-August 2016 | Page 95

FIXING NETWORKS Where Do We Go From Here? From a pragmatic view, I believe the solution to the Army’s current radio dilemma requires four actions. 1. The Army must acknowledge what is and what is not possible according to the physics of radio waves. A single, unifying, Internet-like network is not possible; however, local networks are possible. Consequently, data recovery missions can be launched from higher to lower positions in order to push and with much of our legacy systems. This radio should also be AES standard encrypted, and have auto affiliation built in.12 3. The Army should explore the use of networking radios developed by U.S. manufacturers to platoon-and-below-level operations for sale on the international market. Radios sold by these manufacturers have less stringent security requirements but may still be acceptable for those that operate with information (Photo by Claire Schwerin, PEO C3T, U.S. Army) Soldiers from the 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division at a company outpost during the Army’s second Network Integration Evaluation, NIE 12.1, at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, and Fort Bliss, Texas. The NIEs are helping bring greater network connectivity to the company level so soldiers can communicate through voice, data, images, and video, even in complex terrain. pull data to and from the local networks and populate the higher networks. Irrespective, there will be delays in data communications using such networks that will preclude real-time transfer. Therefore, voice communication will have to suffice to bridge the gap. 2. The Army needs to adjust the requirements for its tactical radios. A single-purpose radio optimized for performance is needed, with a networking waveform on one side and a long-range waveform on the other, cross-domained. If SINCGARS is used as the long-range waveform, then we will have compatibility MILITARY REVIEW  July-August 2016 that is often fleeting and perishable. These radios are not burdened with JTRS requirements, which result in radios too complicated to build and operate. 4. The Maneuver Center of Excellence and the Cyber Center of Excellence should come together to develop or update a concept of operations for an infantry brigade conducting combined-arms offensive operations. I recommend a movement-to-contact scenario to stretch the distances between units a bit more than may be the case in other operations. A concept of operations should provide an opportunity to 93