Military Review English Edition July-August 2016 | Page 95
FIXING NETWORKS
Where Do We Go From Here?
From a pragmatic view, I believe the solution to the
Army’s current radio dilemma requires four actions.
1. The Army must acknowledge what is and
what is not possible according to the physics of radio
waves. A single, unifying, Internet-like network is
not possible; however, local networks are possible.
Consequently, data recovery missions can be launched
from higher to lower positions in order to push and
with much of our legacy systems. This radio should
also be AES standard encrypted, and have auto affiliation built in.12
3. The Army should explore the use of networking radios developed by U.S. manufacturers to platoon-and-below-level operations for sale on the international market. Radios sold by these manufacturers
have less stringent security requirements but may still
be acceptable for those that operate with information
(Photo by Claire Schwerin, PEO C3T, U.S. Army)
Soldiers from the 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division at a company outpost during the Army’s second Network Integration Evaluation,
NIE 12.1, at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, and Fort Bliss, Texas. The NIEs are helping bring greater network connectivity to the
company level so soldiers can communicate through voice, data, images, and video, even in complex terrain.
pull data to and from the local networks and populate
the higher networks. Irrespective, there will be delays
in data communications using such networks that will
preclude real-time transfer. Therefore, voice communication will have to suffice to bridge the gap.
2. The Army needs to adjust the requirements for
its tactical radios. A single-purpose radio optimized
for performance is needed, with a networking waveform on one side and a long-range waveform on the
other, cross-domained. If SINCGARS is used as the
long-range waveform, then we will have compatibility
MILITARY REVIEW July-August 2016
that is often fleeting and perishable. These radios are
not burdened with JTRS requirements, which result
in radios too complicated to build and operate.
4. The Maneuver Center of Excellence and the
Cyber Center of Excellence should come together
to develop or update a concept of operations for an
infantry brigade conducting combined-arms offensive
operations. I recommend a movement-to-contact
scenario to stretch the distances between units a bit
more than may be the case in other operations. A concept of operations should provide an opportunity to
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