Military Review English Edition July-August 2016 | Page 94

· Army Aerial Network Extension Capability Production
Document (CPD)
· Airborne, Maritime, Fixed Small Airborne Networking
Radio (SANR) and Small Airborne Link 16 Terminal
(SALT) CPD
· Army Enterprise Service Desk CPD
· Bridge to Future Network CPD
· Common Hardware Systems (CHS) CPD
· Enterprise Wideband Satellite Communications
(SATCOM) Terminal System (EWSTS) CPD
· Expeditionary Forces Information Services (EFIS) CPD
· Global Broadcast System (GBS) Multi-Echelon
Broadcast Capability (MBC) CPD
· Identity Management (ID) CPD
· Integrated Tactical NetOps (ITNO) Capability CPD
· Key Management Infrastructure CPD
· Manpack CPD
· Multi-tier Networking Vehicular Radio (MNVR) CPD
(replaced GMR CPD)
· Modern Cryptographic Services CPD (added
24 June 2014)
· Network Battle Command Initialization CPD
· Network Operations CPD
· Next Generation Load Device CPD
· Regional Hub Node (RHN) CPD
· Rifleman Radio CPD
· Tactical Internet Management System (TIMS) CPD
· Tactical Network Operations Management System
(TNMS) CPD
· Tactical Services Management (TSM) CPD
· Transmission CPD
· Transportable Tactical Command Communications
(T2C2) CPD
· Two-Channel Leader Radio CPD (to be developed)
· Unified NetOps CPD
· Wideband SATCOM Operational Management System
(WSOMS) CPD
· WIN-T Inc. 2 Rev. 3 CPD
(Graphic by Arin Burgess, Military Review)

Figure 2. Cyber Common Operating
Environment Requirements
Documents

compatibility requires that the radio must be capable of
operating on fourteen different legacy waveforms (see
figure 1, page 91) In addition, the industry must sort
through twenty-eight requirement documents that
92

cover all the different communications applications
(see figure 2). T his well-intentioned requirement to
ensure compatibility directly results in a complex
radio and is likely the reason for the extra weight,
overheating, and battery drain issues associated with
the radios examined so far.
Over the life of the network, overly optimistic
development decisions, compromises, and congressional input have affected how the radios are developed and implemented. For example, the Rifleman
radio is now used as a leader radio; that was never its
intended role.11
Further complicating the radio is the requirement for top-of-the-line, NSA-certified encryption.
However, industry representatives indicate that an
advanced encryption standard (AES)-type encryption
is almost as secure, and would result in far less of an
engineering challenge.
How much more secure is the NSA Type 1 versus AES? Is any encryption completely trusted, or
would better radio procedures make the risk worth
the payoff of a more capable radio? Key leaders at the
Maneuver Center seem to think so. Bottom line, the
radio now fielded seems more optimized for compatibility and security, not actual performance.

Challenges of Cellular and
Wi-Fi Networks
Turning to other issues complicated by similar
challenges, there is no magic to cellular and Wi-Fi.
They are waveforms capable of moving large amounts
of data but are still subject to the laws of physics previously described: high data, short range. Fortunately,
cellular networks in our everyday lives function effectively because a cellular infrastructure surrounding us
supports them. The same is with Wi-Fi; think of the
Wi-Fi hotspots in our lives and the short ranges associated with them. A Wi-Fi network that establishes
itself around the battalion tactical operations center
(TOC) has great potential to move large amounts of
data, but only for those present at the TOC.
Setting aside for a moment the proliferation of
counter-radio electronic-warfare devices that deliberately jam cellular signals, cellular networks have all
the performance wanted. However, a robust infrastructure must be emplaced and secured to make a
tactical cellular network possible.
July-August 2016  MILITARY REVIEW