Military Review English Edition July-August 2016 | Page 93

FIXING NETWORKS JTRS LEGACY WAVEFORMS - Bowman Very High-Frequency (VHF) - Collection Of Broadcasts From Remote Assets (COBRA) - Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS) - Have Quick II - High-Frequency Single sideband/Automatic link establishment (HF SSB/ALE) - NATO Standardization Agreement 5066 (HF 5066) - Link 16 - Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) - Ultra High-Frequency Demand Assigned Multiple Access Satellite communications (UHF DAMA SATCOM) 181/182/183/184 - Ultra High-Frequency Line-of-Sight Communications System (UHF LOS) - Very High-Frequency Line-of-Sight Communications System (VHF LOS) MOBILE AD HOC NETWORKING WAVEFORMS (MANETS) - Wideband Networking Waveform (WNW) - Soldier Radio Waveform (SRW) - Mobile User Objective System (MUOS)–Red Side Processing (Graphic by Arin Burgess, Military Review) Figure1. JTRS Legacy Waveforms, Ad Hoc Networking Waveforms, and Network Enterprise Services “associated with dismounted operations.”9 For context, in the most current active and National Guard brigade-combat-team numbers, there are thirty-five infantry brigades, sixteen armored brigades, and nine Stryker brigades. Yet, even within armored and Stryker MILITARY REVIEW  July-August 2016 brigades, infantry squad leaders up through company commanders have to be prepared to dismount. So, how then does the vehicle-mounted Manpack radio meet 64 percent of the program requirements? Perhaps it is time to update the concept of operations that drives analysis of leader radio requirements. Additionally, the Army neglects to adequately address the radio’s user interface issue with the range issue. One defense-oriented website, the Defense Industry Daily, reported, “Its user interface is an impediment.”10 Indeed. To use the radio system, the network is built on a laptop first with a name assigned to each radio using an ISP-equivalent naming convention. Then, the laptop joins with each radio so that the network program can be physically uploaded. This complex and time-consuming task becomes operationally untenable when the task organization changes during an operation. To attach or detach an element, or to communicate with a diverted enabler, is not a matter of simply uploading the network to new users. Instead, the system is designed in such a manner that it must be completely rebuilt and uploaded again into every radio in the network. Fortunately, every radio in the network is actually not very many. Though the carrying capacity of the network—the number of radios on the same frequency communicating and networking with each other—is advertised to be a maximum of forty-five, it is necessary to keep the number of networked radios to fewer than twenty-eight. More than that begins to bog down the data transfer rate. And, with more than thirty-five radios on the network there is a danger of crashing it. How has the Army come to a point where our twenty-first-century radio is twice the weight, half the range, a battery burden, and a burn hazard as compared to our twentieth-century radio? The answer resides in well-intentioned but overly complicated requirements that result in industry trying to comply with exceedingly complex JTRS standards and National Security Agency (NSA) Type 1 encryption. JTRS Standards and NSA-Certified Encryption Compatibility with legacy systems is among the requirements that industry must accomplish to meet the JTRS standards and field a new radio. Legacy radio 91