Military Review English Edition July-August 2016 | Page 85

VERDUN

created serious difficulties. While keeping his intentions to himself was clearly a successful approach to
military deception, in the operation itself the German
army remained focused on the capture of Verdun
as an end, not a means. Rather than fall back to
more desirable defensive positions at either the rear
slopes surrounding the city or the hills around Fort
Douaumont, the German forces remained exposed on
the plains and slopes in front of Verdun. Irrespective
of setbacks, the assault continued, even as it failed to

it was expected to snap. Thus, even the most strenuous
act of resistance might be the “last gasp” that preceded
mass surrenders, troop rebellions, popular revolts, and
a willingness by the national leadership to come to
terms rather than accept further punishment. (This,
incidentally, was the pattern observed in the final days
of the German army in 1918, which launched a massive
breakthrough offensive led by Falkenhayn’s successor
before collapsing, just as Falkenhayn predicted.)
In the absence of the ability to observe the state of
the enemy’s resolve, German analysts were forced
to focus on the
observable mechanism that preceded it—in this case,
the destruction
of enemy forces.
Unfortunately,
both the Germans
and the French
tended to overestimate the level
of casualties they
were inflicting.16
As a result, both
sides believed that
the military effect
was greater, the
enemy residual
(Photo courtesy of Vikidia)
military capabilTransport vehicles were on the move day and night ferrying troops, armaments, and supplies to the Verdun
ity much lower,
battlefield after March 1916 along the forty-five miles of the Voie Sacrée, or Sacred Way.
and capitulation
achieve Falkenhayn’s true ends—creating a favorable
favorable to the desired political outcome much closer
loss ratio with French forces that would cause the
than it actually was.
collapse of French will while preserving the German
Eventually, the German army was too attrited to
ability to continue operations. These ends could be
maintain its position at Verdun and was forced back
achieved either by blunting French counterattacks at
into the hills north of Fort Douaumont. Elsewhere, the
Verdun or by inducing them elsewhere; they could not
Entente mounted offensives of their own, including an
be achieved by costly assaults from exposed positions
attack at the Somme, which should have been imposby German forces.15
sible had the French forces been as near to collapse as
Another challenge created by Falkenhayn’s theory
Falkenhayn had predicted. In addition, the Russian
of warfare was that the process that translated military
army had recovered from the previous year’s losses and
effects on enemy forces into supposed evidence of enewas advancing against Germany’s Austro-Hungarian
my capitulation that were difficult to observe. The enallies. Consequently, the Kaiser replaced Falkenhayn,
emy’s will was not expected to slowly and visibly bend;
who was unable to show results from the enormous
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