Military Review English Edition July-August 2016 | Page 78

(Photo by 1st Lt. Jonathan J. Springer, U.S. Army)

Soldiers from Battery A, 2nd Battalion, 320th Field Artillery Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, fire rounds
from their M119A2 howitzer at enemy targets 13 January 2008 during Operation Fulton Harvest in the Al-Jazīrah region of Iraq.

UASs during the targeting process. The DIVARTY S-2’s
development of TAIs based on artillery acquisitions and
GMTI analysis not only informed these efforts, but it
also supported the development of triggers for retasking UAS to the DIVARTY during critical phases of the
counterfire fight. During these periods, the DIVARTY
performed as a functional joint air-ground integration
cell focused on counterfire within a defined TAI. It located targets, cleared ground and airspace, and processed
fire missions against identified targets in accordance
with the attack guidance matrix. DIVARTY’s ability and
authority to coordinate directly with corps and adjacent
divisions assisted these efforts.
The primary challenge to integrating UASs is
the extra steps involved in fire-mission processing.
Within the 101st DIVARTY, the lethal fires section
was responsible for coordinating the necessary steps.
Integrating UAS and artillery during key points in the
counterfire fight proved to be highly effective, and the
processes developed by the 101st DIVARTY filled a
void in existing doctrine regarding artillery interdiction
(i.e., proactive counterfire).
MCTP observers routinely note that poor
fires planning results in insufficient support to the
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ground scheme of maneuver.6 In contrast, the 101st
DIVARTY’s experiences at WFXs 15-05 and 16-02
highlighted the value of detailed plans, and the unit received recognition for expertly meeting doctrinal fires
planning requirements.
The key to the unit’s success was the implementation
of a plans synchronization meeting for fires planning
aligned with division planning horizons. The 101st
DIVARTY plans synchronization meeting enabled the
staff to conduct field artillery planning that synchronized efforts across all warfighting functions. As the
maneuver headquarters, the division was responsible for
fire-support planning and the DIVARTY was responsible for fires planning to support the scheme of maneuver.
The DIVARTY’s planning framework created and
facilitated a link between the division and DIVARTY
staffs. Current doctrine does not clearly define this
link, so DIVARTY’s implementation of this framework
helped delineate the specified and implied responsibilities of each organization.
The division target working group, enabled by
the staff, used the D3A targeting process to facilitate fire support planning that developed fire support tasks (FSTs), a high-payoff target list and target
July-August 2016  MILITARY REVIEW