Military Review English Edition July-August 2016 | Page 76

establishing, disseminating, and tracking permissive
fire support coordination measures (FSCMs). These
expedite, as opposed to restrict, attacking targets with
fire and provide graphic control measures.5
These observations did not apply to the 101st
DIVARTY during either of its WFX experiences
because it had established and monitored FSCMs in
the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System
and Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination
System. Instead, the primary battlefield geometry
challenge resulted from the planned placement and
trigger-based movement of FSCMs.
The two most important FSCMs were the coordinated fire lines (CFLs) and fire support coordination
lines (FSCLs). The former is the line beyond which the
establishing headquarters may fire surface-to-surface
munitions without additional coordination. Corps
headquarters typically establish the latter within its
area of operations to coordinate the expeditious attack
of targets beyond the line by joint weapons systems.
Since these FSCMs were permissive, any unit could
shoot beyond them after coordinating with the establishing headquarters.
Besides their importance in facilitating fires, CFLs
and FSCLs helped delineate the areas of responsibility
for attacking targets (see figure). The corps “owns” the
area beyond the FSCL, the area between the FSCL and
CFL defines the division’s deep fight, and areas short
of the CFL belong to brigade combat tea ms (i.e., the
division’s close fight). During WFX 15-5, the 101st
DIVARTY learned that these permissive control
measures were too far apart if planned for based on the
maximum range of conventional munitions. Planning
FSCMs based on the maximum range of cannon and
rocket systems inadvertently allowed the enemy to
position where DIVARTY could not fire without using
its limited supply of extended-range or precision munitions. As a result, doing so created safe havens in which
the enemy operated with limited disruption.
Although rocket munitions such as guided multiplelaunch rocket systems and Army tactical missile systems might have been available to range targets within
these artificial safe havens, their limited availability and
attack guidance criteria made it impractical to do so.
As a result, the division had to request or “re-role” air
support assets to engage enemy formations in order to
continue shaping its deep fight.
74

Similar issues arose when planning the CFL at the
maximum range of cannon systems. Doing so forced
the 101st DIVARTY to use general support fire assets
in the close fight instead of to shape future operations.
CFLs should be as close as possible to the forward
line of troops (FLOT). The DIVARTY planned CFLs
at two-thirds of the maximum range of direct-support cannon battalions (a variation of the one-third–
two-thirds rule of thumb for artillery positioning).
DIVARTY also allocated general support-reinforcing
assets to brigades with an enumerated number of rockets available for reinforcing fires. This allowed brigade
combat teams to attack enemy formations short and
long of the CFL.
Similarly, the DIVARTY planned FSCLs based on
the range of the most commonly available rocket munition type instead of extended-range or precision munitions. Both techniques denied enemy safe havens and
allowed DIVARTY elements to achieve effects throughout the operational area in support of the division’s counterfire fight. Battlefield geometry also plays an important
role in a DIVARTY’s ability to conduct counterfire.
Counterfire. Poorly placed FSCMs hinder effective
friendly fires and magnify the impact of artillery range
advantages enjoyed by WFX enemies as well as real-world enemies and adversaries. Many enemy artillery
systems outrange U.S. systems, and enemies are technically capable of achieving a greater volume of fire. Both
WFXs highlighted this operational reality and challenged the 101st DIVARTY’s ability to destroy, defeat,
and disrupt enemy artillery systems.
A DIVARTY is its division’s counterfire headquarters, so the counterfire fight was the 101st DIVARTY’s
focus during its WFXs. This mission-critical task sets the
conditions for future division operations by attriting enemy indirect-fire systems before friendly maneuver forces
come within range. This task has two components that
become separate fire support tasks. First, reactive counterfire focuses on engaging enemy indirect fire systems
following target acquisition. The 101st DIVARTY positioned its Q-37 Firefinder radar systems so they could
detect surface fires between the FLOT and the FSCL.
Due to the large volume of counterfire, DIVARTY split
responsibility for fire mission processing. The target processing section (TPS) processed acquisitions for counterfire, while the fire control element remained focused on
processing planned targets and targets of opportunity.
July-August 2016  MILITARY REVIEW