Military Review English Edition July-August 2016 | Page 52

communities in a manner that inures them from
violent alternatives.32
This matters, as it was precisely the government relation to its people that underpinned the Democratic
Security Policy. Locating government legitimacy as
its center of gravity, the counterinsurgency campaign
extended the state to long-neglected communities,
through the imposition of a war tax upon the well-off,
socioeconomic opportunities, and creation of more
societal and geographic inclusion than Colombia
had ever known historically.33 From 2002 to 2010,
the years of the Democratic Security Policy, average
economic growth, per capita GDP, and health coverage doubled, all while poverty rates decreased from 53
percent to 37 percent, and inflation from 6.9 percent
to 2.5 percent.
In contrast, in March 2016 inflation hit 8 percent,
its highest level since October 2001. Foreign direct
investment has continued despite currency fluctuations but benefits mostly those areas where business is
already deemed attractive. Meanwhile, Colombia’s gini
coefficient—a measure of income inequality—remains
the second worst regionally, despite some improvement
in recent years.34

The economic insecurity of Colombia today, and
the added sources of instability typical of a postconflict
society, look likely to produce a mass of dispossessed and
marginalized communities, forced either to embrace
crime as a way of life or susceptible, at the very least, to
FARC influence in a future electoral contest (particularly where these populations reside in or near one of the
peace zones). Given Santos’s own unpopularity, a change
in government may be just what Colombia needs, but
FARC looks more likely to exploit rather than address
the country’s continued grievances.35
Indeed, FARC has demonstrated a growing awareness
of the security and economic vacuum created by the state's
failure to sustain the democratic mobilization that typified
Uribe's first term. FARC has thus dramatically increased
its efforts to mobilize cocaleros (cultivators of coca),
marginalized indigenous elements, and the extreme left
wing of labor and of the political spectrum (e.g., students).
These efforts, accompanied by a robust information
warfare campaign, have allowed FARC to interject itself
into national politics in the same manner as Hezbollah
or the Nepali Maoists—or any other political party that
also fields its own armed forces. The future of Colombia’s
long-standing democratic tradition is at risk.

Biographies
Gen. Carlos A. Ospina, National Army of Colombia, retired, is a distinguished professor of practice at the College of
International Security Affairs, National Defense University. A former commander of the Colombian Armed Forces
and the National Army of Colombia, he organized the Commando Battalion and the Lancero unit—key units that
dealt FARC severe blows late in the conflict. He is the author of A la Cima sobre los hombros del Diablo, Los
años en que Colombia recupero la esperanza, and Batallas no contadas.
Thomas A. Marks, PhD, is distinguished professor of irregular warfighting strategy at the College of International
Security Affairs (CISA), National Defense University (NDU). He holds a BS in engineering from the United States
Military Academy, MA degrees in history and political science from the University of Hawaii at Manoa, and a PhD
in political science from that university. A former military officer, he has an extensive analytical and operational
background, and for the past twelve years has been chair of the War and Conflict Studies Department at CISA.
David H. Ucko, PhD, is an associate professor at the College of International Security Affairs, National
Defense University. He holds a PhD from the Department of War Studies, King’s College, London. He is the
author of Counterinsurgency in Crisis: Britain and the Challenges of Modern Warfare and The New
Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars, and co-editor of Reintegrating
Armed Groups after Conflict.

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July-August 2016  MILITARY REVIEW