Military Review English Edition July-August 2016 | Page 46

The Maoists were
effective to the point that
they were able to control
elections and twice held
the prime ministership,
which allowed their party
to neutralize still further
remaining resistance
within the demoralized
security forces and to
expand its influence
and solidify its finances. Although statistics
have not been officially
tabulated, the numbers
of victims for the period
of “peace” appears to be
in the thousands, most
assaulted as opposed to
(Photo courtesy of Ingmar Zahorsky, Flickr)
Maoists from Nepal’s Young Communist League rally against the government of Prime Minister Madkilled.12 There is little an
hav Kumar Nepal 11 September 2009 in Kathmandu, Nepal. The first Maoist government had colanti-Maoist citizen can
lapsed just a few months prior as the president had refused to dismiss the army chief over a dispute.
do or expect by way of
gains that were militarily beyond its reach. In such a
protection of his or her person and property. The state
context, what is peace?
displays either indifference or incapacity to popular
The case of Nepal offers a cautionary and relevant
security needs, but Nepal is, officially, at peace.
tale. The “people’s war” waged by the Communist Party
of Nepal (Maoist) is normally associated with only
Translating Military Gains into
the 1996–2006 period of overt hostilities. Since then,
Political Settlement
Nepal has been technically at peace. This though is a
On the topic of peace, St Augustine wrote, “There
false dichotomy because what has occurred in Nepal
is no one who does not love peace … It is for the sake
since 2006 offers a significant illustration of the changof peace that men wage wars and even brigands seek to
ing character of insurgency, particularly as it concerns
keep the peace with their comrades.”13 The implications
the use of terrorism across the phases of war and peace. for Colombia are obvious. An ambiguous term, “peace”
Though they ostensibly reintegrated into normal
politics following the ceasefire and comprehensive peace
accord of 2006, the Maoists continued to state (publicly
and in their private sessions) that they were involved in
an armed revolutionary struggle strategically and were
only proceeding by a different path tactically (i.e., political struggle).10 They moved aggressively to use covert
violence—terrorism carried out against local political
opponents—as opposed to overt guerrilla warfare to
solidify their position and win parliamentary votes. They
used specially constituted forces, notably the paramil(Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)
itary Young Communist League (YC L)—comprised
A Maoist slogan in Kathmandu, Nepal, just opposite the U.S. emoverwhelmingly of combatants who were transferred
bassy. The first line reads “Long live MA[rx]LE[nin]MA[o]ism and
and “reflagged”—to carry out these attacks.11
Prachanda Path."
44

July-August 2016  MILITARY REVIEW