Military Review English Edition July-August 2016 | Page 42

Colombia and
the War-to-Peace
Transition

Cautionary Lessons from
Other Cases
Gen. Carlos A. Ospina, National Army of
Colombia, Retired
Thomas A. Marks, PhD
David H. Ucko, PhD

I

n 1948, Colombia entered a period of civil war from
which it has never fully emerged. Since 1964, a key
contributor to the violence has been the Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC). Although motivated originally by high levels of inequality between rich
and poor, and guided strategically by Marxist-Leninist
ideology and people’s war theory, FARC’s struggle
evolved over several decades to increasingly emphasize
drug trafficking and violence against the people. Due
to various missteps and missed opportunities by the
government, the group grew in strength, reaching its
peak during the first years of the presidency of Andrés
Pastrana (1998–2002). Thereafter, it declined precipitously as it was mauled by the Colombian military
during a national resurgence that reached its peak in the
course of the initial administration of President Álvaro
Uribe (2002–2006) and continued in the second Uribe
administration (2006–2010).
President Juan Manuel Santos (2010–2014) had initially pledged to continue Uribe’s policies, but instead he
startled all with a commitment to an open-ended peace
process that continues to this day. Santos was narrowly
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re-elected to a second term (2014–2018) but now
finds himself faced with the stubborn refusal of FARC
to commit definitively to ending the conflict. This has
placed the increasingly unpopular Santos administration
in the awkward position of needing a deal at all costs, yet
one that will retain legitimacy with a people skeptical
about FARC’s intentions.
The skepticism is warranted. While there have
been many claims of irreversible progress in the talks,
progress on substantive issues remains limited, not least
on the actual demobilization of FARC as an armed
organization and its integration into the nonviolent
political process. This deadlock is not surprising: after
years of decline, FARC’s leadership appears to have
realized that their armed struggle had no prospects of
success. As part of its revised emphasis on the political aspects of the struggle, it conditionally accepted
new peace talks but remained determined to obtain as
much advantage as possible by exploiting the government’s eagerness to seal a deal.
Specifically, FARC’s proposals reflect three objectives: a desperate attempt to gain legitimacy before the
Colombian people and the international community; to
July-August 2016  MILITARY REVIEW