Military Review English Edition July-August 2016

Current Summary Offensive Cyberspace Operations / Cyber Effects Request Status EW EW CYBER TEAM ENEMY RADAR TYPE Emitter Detection CELL TOWER Cyber Force Protection Condition  ALPHA  BRAVO X CHARLIE   DELTA Battle Drill in Effect • Network – 12D • COMM – 4A ENEMY GPS JAMMER CELL TOWER BLUE NETWORK STATUS GRAY NETWORK STATUS Enemy High Value Individual (HVI) Cyber Personas • Name • Location • Alias AK47@ mail.com STAT C Current Summary Cyberspace Operations Significant Activities TYPE STAT Network Outage Network Impaired Social Media* Brigade Combat Power QTY TYPE WOLFHOUND SHADOW GRAY EAGLE DUKE CREW 3 1 1 20 48 Current Summary Electromagnetic Spectrum Significant Activities TYPE STAT F Electronic Attack A E Emitter Detection B E Joint Task Force/ Division Enablers AVAIL TYPE EC-130 RC-12 EA-18G Combat Mission Team Cyber Protection Team N Y Y Y Y Operations: Current 24 hours • Cyber-Electronic Warfare (EW) Support to Task Force (TF) Falcon during Operation RAZORBACK FURY • Cyber-EW Support to TF Hawk vicinity: Objectives ANVIL and HAMMER • Intel & Cyber-EW support to TF Dragon vicinity: Objective SAWBLADE HVI #1 Operations: Next 24 hours RED NETWORK STATUS HVI #2 HVI #3 • SHADOW electronic attack on target (38S GH 12345, 54321) • Counter UAS • Cyber support to brigade combat team strategic messaging (Graphic from authors) Figure. Sample Cyber Situational Understanding Overlay on the Common Operational Picture must ascertain what information regarding cyberspace matters most to commanders. During combat operations, commanders, supported by their staffs, monitor and assess progress, make decisions to exploit opportunities and counter threats, and direct the application of combat power at decisive points in time.28 Cyberspace is a significant part of that calculus, especially concerning its effects on mission command and highly networked forms of combat power. Information that will likely comprise the basic content of the cyber SU overlay for the COP include friendly, host-nation, and enemy network status, cyber threats and enemy capabilities, key cyberspace infrastructure in the area of operations, cyberspace authorities and rules of engagement, and social media trends, to name a few. Second, capability developers must consider where cyber SU information comes from and how to obtain it. 22 Currently, only joint cyber mission forces are authorized to conduct cyberspace intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and cyberspace operational preparation of the environment. So a great deal of information about cyberspace will originate and reside in databases at the national and strategic levels. That said, relevant data and information derived from organic information collection efforts at Army tactical echelons can provide important context. One practical example is connecting a cyber-persona, derived from a national or joint cyberspace asset, with the identity of a real person (or organization) known to be residing in a unit’s OE, as derived through local information collection. Fusing these sources provides greater situational understanding for the tactical commander and will help higher headquarters see cyberspace more clearly. July-August 2016 MILITARY REVIEW

Military Review English Edition July-August 2016 | Page 24