Military Review English Edition July-August 2016 | Page 22

Defense’s (DOD) Joint Concept for Cyberspace states that
shared situational awareness of cyberspace is one of eight
key elements to joint cyberspace operations.5 This concept
gave birth to the Joint Cyber Situational Awareness Initial
Capabilities Document, which describes requirements for
situational awareness of cyberspace at strategic echelons.6
Coincidentally, much of the same information applicable
at joint strategic echelons is also relevant at Army tactical
echelons, where the Army has asserted that its need for
cyber SU is most urgent.7
The U.S. Army Capstone Concept asserts that in order
to maintain an advantage in cyberspace, the future Army
must provide a capability for leaders and soldiers that
helps them to understand how and when adversaries
employ cyberspace capabilities, and how to respond.8
It also recommends investments in mission command
capabilities and systems that allow the Army to network
the force and improve common situational understanding in order to gain and maintain a cyber electromagnetic
activities advantage.9 The U.S. Army Operating Concept
identifies key capability development areas focused on
science and technology initiatives to provide increased
commanders’ situational understanding through common operational pictures down to the tactical edge. This,
it states, “may help commanders gain and maintain a
position of relative advantage across the contested cyberspace domain and electromagnetic spectrum.”10
Joint and Army doctrine publications also point
toward the need for cyber SU. JP 3-12(R), Cyberspace
Operations, explicitly states that cyberspace operations
depend upon “current and predictive knowledge of
cyberspace and the operational environment (OE).”11
ADRP 6-0, Mission Command, stresses the importance
of the common operating picture (COP) in building
situational understandi ng.12 FM 6-02, Signal Support to
Operations, says “by integrating information from across
the breadth of the area of operations, Army forces are
able to maintain more relevant and complete situational
understanding … [allowing] commanders to employ
the right capabilities, in the right place, and at the right
time.”13 Not surprisingly, these doctrine documents reflect
the strategic message of senior cyber leaders.
In his Joint Force Quarterly article, “Ten Propositions
Regarding Cyberspace Operations,” Maj. Gen. Brett
Williams explains the urgency of cyberspace situational
awareness. Williams writes, “Developing cyber situational
awareness is a high priority for DOD. The challenge
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is providing a complete picture of the domain that is
consistent, accurate, current, and customizable for
commanders at all levels.”14 Williams also concludes
that commanders must be able to see and understand
cyberspace in order to defend it.15 This simple truth
justifies a cyber SU capability for the Army. However,
Army capability development efforts for cyber SU are
presently stagnant.

Why Army Cyber SU Capability
Development Efforts are Stagnant

If you don’t know where you are going, you might wind up
someplace else.16
—Yogi Berra
In a perfect world, the Army could anticipate its
capability needs far enough in advance to permit the
traditional acquisition process to succeed. Unfortunately,
innovation in cyberspace is moving too fast to make
that timeline practical for cyber SU. The typical timeframe for identifying a need, writing the requirements,
negotiating the Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System (JCIDS) process, and then producing a new widget is five to eight years. The JCIDS
process attempts to accommodate information systems
software development with a more efficient Information
Technology (IT)-Box option.17 Although the Army is
utilizing the IT-Box, it has been slow to approve the first
cyberspace-related requirements document.18 One of the
Army’s challenges might lie in an acquisition system that
is tied to old paradigms.
Training and Doctrine Command’s Gen. David G.
Perkins pointed out that the defense acquisition system
is still geared toward filling gaps that differentiate us
from a known enemy as opposed to increasing our rate
of innovation.19 Perkins said the Army must be willing
to kill old programs and then put those resources into
new and more transferrable technologies.20 He added
that in order to innovate, the Army must avoid creating requirements with too much specificity else they
become self-confining.21
Clearly, the Army has a strong desire to innovate, but
an outmoded acquisition system and old thinking are
not the only things slowing them down. Another challenge is a discordant cyberspace capabilities development
effort. Currently, there are several overlapping information system capability documents in draft.22 All of them
July-August 2016  MILITARY REVIEW