Military Review English Edition July-August 2016 | Page 16

efforts, it became clear that we had a training shortfall. Leaders and the workforce were not achieving the high level of performance required to move the arsenal forward.” This became a focus for the next process-improvement event. “What we learned by looking at the workforce development process is that much of our previous focus was on making our production more efficient and not on people,” Schiller said. “As difficult as it was to change this process (workforce development), we knew that our ability to grow in the Army’s organic base was limited unless we did change.”14 Similarly, the U.S. Army Recruiting Command at Fort Knox provides a superb example of an organization that determined its information technology (IT) systems were failing to meet its needs and took visionary action to remedy the situation. Army recruiting processes were being serviced by an outdated IT system that did not give recruiters and their commanders the tools needed to accomplish their missions. The many recruiting applications were not integrated, requiring separate log-in, and a laborious virtual private network (VPN) connection needed to be established to access routine information, which was very difficult when the recruiters were away from their stations. The Recruiting Command commanding general, then Maj. Gen. Allen Batschelet, took time to fully understand the problem and subsequently marshalled the necessary external support to put the command on a trajectory to acquiring a state-of-the-art customer-relationship management application. With the same system businesses use to identify new customers, Recruiting Command devised the architecture to make the customer-relationship management application accessible from tablet computers without the need to first establish a VPN connection.15 Although the conversion will take years, this is a solid first step in the right direction. While in the midst of attempting these changes, Batschelet shared, “I’m finding bureaucratic courage more rare than battlefield courage.”16 What he was alluding to was how hard it was to find supporters willing to shortcut risk-averse processes to facilitate innovation. Implementing a significant effort like this is difficult and will typically not succeed without involved leadership and management. In this case, they were present. 14 Organize to achieve your goals. In a corporate setting, many companies find they must undertake moderate organizational change at least once a year and major change every four-to-five years. However, similar change is much less frequent in the Army, perhaps because the authority to modify the organization is reserved for the higher echelons.17 But, hard is not impossible, and leaders must constantly keep a running estimate of how well their organizations remain suited to accomplish their missions based on both effectiveness and efficiency. And, when appropriate, they must implement change. Artificial divisions in process management between organizations, continued organizational conflict, inequitable workload distribution, and excessive cycle time spent in completing a process may all be signs structural change is needed. This assessment comes naturally to Army planners when devising a task organization for a given operation by conducting a troops-to-task analysis and allocating forces appropriately. Assessing the need for permanent change in a noncombat situation when members have become very accustomed to the existing organization is more challeng ing and typically encounters significant resistance. Army Medical Command’s (MEDCOM) sweeping reorganization from five regional medical commands to four multifunctional regional health commands integrating medical, dental, public health, Warrior Care, and transition functions provides a great example of a command reorganizing itself to meet emerging mission requirements and a changing environment.18 Conceived by Lt. Gen. Patricia Horoho, then surgeon general, the reorganization began in 2015 with the intent to bring the command in line with the changing needs of the Army and to provide a single geographic point of accountability for health readiness in each region, aligned where possible to an Army corps. Prior to the reorganization, MEDCOM had twenty subordinate headquarters. Following the change, it had fourteen, allowing the command to become more agile and responsive. However, accomplishing this needed reorganization proved to be a significant administrative and managerial challenge. Not only was the surgeon general required to obtain the approval of the Army senior leaders, but the proposal required repeated coordination with the defense health establishment, as well July-August 2016  MILITARY REVIEW