Military Review English Edition July-August 2016 | Page 141

BOOK REVIEWS

the bank was not only necessary but also constitutional, after receiving strident arguments to the
contrary from Jefferson. His signing of the bill led
Jefferson and Madison to believe he was under the
control of Hamilton. Fleming demonstrates this
perception was incorrect, showing there was a nearly
even split in the disputed decisions of the administration, half favoring Jefferson. The author also takes
issue with historians believing Washington did not
intend to be an activist president.
Jefferson had an almost religious fervor and faith
in liberty, a utopian perception of it. He believed the
bank would inherently favor the rich and further the
formation of an aristocratic class. His view toward
liberty was also the driving force behind his blind
support of the French
Revolution, which
caused the final split
between Jefferson
and Washington.
Fleming paints
Washington’s forbearance of the cabinet warfare, played
out in the newspapers
and vicious personal
criticism, as evidence
of his leadership
and political skills.
Washington had
excellent sources and information on the actions of
Jefferson and Madison. His interest in considering all
sides of questions and receiving unvarnished advice led
Washington to request both Jefferson and Hamilton
extend their tenures in office. Washington also kept the
opposition leader, Jefferson, close by and demonstrated
neutrality—a smart political move, Fleming argues.
In contrast, Fleming has a less favorable view of
Jefferson’s terms as president, unsurprisingly. Jefferson’s
lack of military knowledge led to his insistence on
building a small and poorly equipped class of naval
gunboat of his own design, insufficient for the challenges faced. The Louisiana Purchase is portrayed as
virtually pure luck from which Jefferson benefitted,
an act that ensured his easy reelection. While he knew
the Constitution and pledged his strict adherence to it,
he was silent on Constitutional matters. Moreover, he
MILITARY REVIEW  July-August 2016

acquiesced to the “implied powers” utilized by predecessors he had been so critical of previously, further
demonstrating his hypocrisy. Jefferson’s action or
inaction set the table for the War of 1812, and Fleming
argues his writing on nullification at other times in his
career sowed seeds which at least in part came to fruition by the time of the Civil War.
Washington, while too tolerant of the dissension
in his cabinet, is portrayed as a leader and model to
which every president should aspire. In comparison,
the nearly unceasing criticism of Jefferson is softened
only by Fleming’s acknowledgment that “Jefferson’s gift
for inspiring words should persuade the readers … to
summon forgiveness and rueful—or better sympathetic—admiration for this deeply conflicted man.”
Fleming’s contentions throughout this fine scholarly
work are clear and well supported. This would be an excellent addition to the library of any historian or officer
with an interest in the founders.

Gary R. Ryman, Scott Township, Pennsylvania

COWARDICE
A Brief History

Chris Walsh, Princeton University Press,
Princeton, New Jersey, 2014, 304 pages

O

n 10 August 1943, Lt. Gen. George S. Patton
met Pvt. Paul G. Bennett while visiting soldiers in an evacuation hospital in Sicily. When
Patton inquired about Bennett’s injury, the young
soldier replied, “It’s my nerves.” Patton grew angry and
yelled, “Your nerves? Hell, you’re just a goddamned
coward you yellow son of a bitch.” He then slapped
the soldier twice while shouting, “I ought to shoot you
myself right now.” This now infamous scene not only
earned Patton a rebuke from Gen. Dwight Eisenhower
but it also brought to light Patton’s anachronistic view
of cowardice. The media response and public outcry
that followed signaled a shift in societal understanding
of this complicated emotion and begged the question:
What exactly do we mean by cowardice?
In Cowardice: A Brief History, Chris Walsh attempts
to answer this question and many others surrounding the taboo word. Early in his book, Walsh defines a
coward as “someone who, because of excessive fear, fails
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