Military Review English Edition July-August 2016 | Page 131

BOOK REVIEWS

The author, Brian Mazanec, lays out his “norm evolution theory” in an analytical framework that considers actors, motives, and other material and nonmaterial factors.
His theory indicates that the development of norms goes
through three stages: norm emergence (where the norm
comes into existence), norm cascade (a tipping point
where the norm’s international adoption accelerates), and
norm internalization (where states and actors accept it).
Mazanec applies this framework to three historical case studies: the development and accepted use of
chemical and biological warfare, strategic bombing, and
nuclear weapons. In each
of his three case studies,
he closely examines the
impact of the variables
during each of the three
stages. He devotes a separate chapter to each of
the three case studies. At
the end of each chapter,
he includes a summarization table that indicates
which factors were of
greater significance in
developing the norms.
Based on his findings in the three case studies, he lays
out how he believes the emergence and development of
norms will proceed for cyber war. He presents primary
and secondary hypotheses to examine candidate norms
for emerging cyber warfare. He also looks at recent
known cyberattacks (such as the 1982 Trans-Siberian Gas
Pipeline, 2007 Estonia, 2007 Operation Orchard, 2008
Georgia, 2009 Stuxnet, 2012 Saudi-Aramco, and 2012
Operation Ababil) to further refine the likelihood of these
candidate norms and who the leading advocates will likely
be for their development, and opines why.
He includes a chapter on conclusions and lists four
recommendations for U.S. policymakers to consider as the
world continues to expand operations into cyberspace.
Mazanec certainly has the credentials and background
to examine this topic. The book is well written from start
to finish and flows in a logical manner. He does a good job
with definitions and includes a page of pertinent acronyms. I would recommend this book more for strategic
policy makers than for students of cyber war.

Lt. Col. George Hodge, U.S. Army, Retired,
Lansing, Kansas
MILITARY REVIEW  July-August 2016

COUNTERINSURGENCY AND THE
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

Volume 1, The First Counterinsurgency Era,
1899–1945
Leo J. Daugherty III, MacFarland & Company, Inc.,
Publishers, Jefferson, North Carolina,
2015, 412 pages

T

his work appears to be “straight history,” recounting events in the development of the U.S.
Marine Corps as an institution. Leo Daugherty
provides the expected chronology for marine interventions in the Philippines, Caribbean islands, Central
America, and the Pacific. The historical narrative
delivers sufficient political context for marine counterinsurgency (COIN) and related operations, accounts
of institutional and field decisions, combat actions, and
summaries of “lessons learned” in fine style.
Daugherty weaves three major interpretive threads
into his factual account. The first is the evolution of
the 1940 Small Wars Manual—considered by marines
as the “bible” for irregular warfare. (It was not another instructional drill book.) The second was the
transformation of education and training supporting
marine warfighting generally, but COIN in particular.
Foremost were the various Marine Corps schools,
educating resident student officers to think in complex environments where “cookbook” solutions could
not be had. The last thread deals with the emerging
requirement for unique formations possessing special
skills—Marine Raider and parachute battalions in the
Pacific War—intended to fight behind enemy lines
and employ lessons learned from years of conducting
COIN in austere environments.
Of particular interest is Appendix A, “A Creditable
Position: James Carson Breckinridge and the
Development of Marine Corps Schools,” by Troy
Elkins. It’s clear why Daugherty included this piece,
since education—not merely training—is indispensable to successful counterinsurgency.
Today’s education imperatives reflect quite old
requirements, such as Breckinridge’s 1929 demand for
greater critical thinking capability in military leaders.
He tried to overcome his students’ tendencies to give
solutions to problems they believed their instructors
wanted, not ones they felt best fit the situation. Our
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