was an overly ambitious fantasy given the state of many necessary supporting technologies , was fiscally irresponsible during a recession , and jeopardized the peaceful methods Eisenhower was keen on pursuing to keep a lid on competition and expenditures . In a telling comment , Sambaluk has a bit of fun noting Dyna-Soar would eventually go the way of the “ dinosaur ,” but acknowledges that in 1957 , in the hysteria following Sputnik , it seemed quite possible that it would go from concept to creation , with all that entailed .
Sambaluk lucidly explains Ike felt that the superior American space technologies could pierce the seemingly opaque Soviet military system . He was supremely confident satellites , once operational , would expose the so-called “ bomber gap ” and “ missile gap ” as gross distortions of reality , derailing agendas demanding ever greater spending on yet more weapons of war — or so he thought . Eisenhower ’ s “ Open Skies ” initiative sought tangible verification of capabilities through routine , unencumbered space overflights ; however , Khrushchev , suspicious of sinister designs , thwarted the proposal . Of course , once Sputnik was aloft and transmitting , overflight became a nonissue and actually facilitated Eisenhower ’ s goal , since Sputnik ’ s successive orbits set a precedent by default when the United States did nothing to hinder its path .
“ Gently in manner , strongly in deed ” defined Ike ’ s approach to politics . His distinct leadership style forged combined allied military victory in World War II by helping him to manage the ceaseless juggling of fractious agendas , competing priorities , and clashing personalities . That same wholesome , friendly demeanor and tact served him well through his first presidential term . With great nuance , Sambaluk compellingly argues this executive style — the hidden hand — worked well when the international scene was relatively tranquil . But , when the situation became tumultuous , Eisenhower ’ s style was often misinterpreted , or mischaracterized as disengaged , out of sync , and aloof .
The author artfully captures Eisenhower ’ s persistent frustration in trying to regain control of the initiative in the space race while tamping down unbridled , expensive , and antagonistic programs , which continually threatened to slip the leash in the wake of Sputnik I and II and further destabilize Cold War relations . Certainly , much of Ike ’ s heartburn in this area is attributed to his unwillingness to compromise classified insights that would have thrown cold water on ridiculous claims about the true state of affairs . The book marvelously captures Ike ’ s disdain for getting down in the political trenches that did not help his cause . He saw himself as a unifier who refrained from engaging in overly partisan politics . Ike also had an abiding faith that “ public opinion is the only motivating force there is in a republic or in a democracy ,” and he was loathe to defy it . He felt “ public opinion must be … informed … if it is going to be effective .” This was a real test for the average citizen , putting aside their mostly pedestrian concerns , given the classified and complex nature of many of the issues .
In his “ Epilogue and Conclusion ,” Sambaluk succinctly analyzes larger themes of the time : the transition from Eisenhower to John F . Kennedy , and Air Force rationale for pushing so hard in seeming opposition to Ike ’ s goals . Near the end , he delivers a few diamonds . First , in Kennedy ‘ s worldview , international politics drove the moon-landing race . He once told the NASA director , quite candidly , that if not for that imperative , “ we shouldn ’ t be spending this kind of money , because I ’ m not that interested in space .” This would come as a shock to those who so closely associate Kennedy with the moon mission . Second , by the mid-1960s , NASA ’ s public affairs office was saying “ we are in a new phase of our program … each flight is not going to be spectacular ” and it recommended NASA leadership should “ discourage … activity , such as ticker-tape parades ” for future astronauts . Again , this runs against the grain of prevalent contemporary thinking on the subject , and the author captures it eloquently . Finally , he provocatively suggests Eisenhower ’ s now-revered farewell address , which cautioned American society about the insidious and growing power of the military-industrial complex , “ represented an admission of defeat more than a warning for the future .”
Overall , a splendid rendering of the behind-thescenes complexities of early American space-policy formation as leaders wrestled with appropriate responses and future direction at the height of an increasingly heated Cold War .
Biography Dr . John H . Modinger , lieutenant colonel , U . S . Air Force , retired , is an assistant professor in the Department of Joint Interagency and Multinational Operations at the U . S . Army Command and General Staff College , Fort Leavenworth , Kansas .
126 July-August 2016
MILITARY REVIEW