Military Review English Edition July-August 2015 | Page 46

easier to implement, and they are often
thought to be sufficient. However, in and
of themselves, they do not create enduring
cultural change.

The Realities of Army
Cultures
Elevating the notion of soldier over that
of warrior is likely to meet resistance. This
is a new and necessary cultural change. The
current Army culture emerged from embedding and reinforcing mechanisms that have
served current members well. For the Army,
however, the cultural legacy of muddy boots,
anti-intellectualism, and egalitarianism hinder
the effective development of senior leaders.
(Photo by Sgt. 1st Class Mike Brantley, 10th Sustainment Brigade PAO)
The muddy boots legacy rewards troop
Maj. Scott Meyer signals a train forward 10 February 2006 as it enters the Taji
time, rarely permits off-track assignments,
Rail Yard at Camp Taji, Iraq. Meyer served as a program manager with Strateand results in a narrow experience base.
gic Mobility-Iraq Railroad.
The anti-intellectual legacy focuses almost
requires leaders of the entire enterprise. The Army’s
exclusively on warfighting competence and disdains
culture must reflect this.
intellectual pursuits, both for self-development and for
The Army’s organizational culture is a legitiadvanced professional military and civilian education.
mate source of pride; nevertheless, it is important
The egalitarian legacy, while essential to providing
to understand what organizational culture is and to
opportunity for all members, sometimes hinders the
attend to its implications. Renowned scholar Edgar
Army’s support for the further development of high
Schein defines organizational culture as “a pattern
performers who show potential for senior leadership.
of shared basic assumptions learned by a group
Perhaps similar cultural impediments exist in the other
as it solved its problems of external adaptation
armed services, especially following more than a decade
and internal integration, … taught to new memof deployments.
bers as the correct way to perceive, think about,
Muddy boots. Shaped by the past twenty years and
and react to organizational problems.”8 Schein’s
reinforced with two long wars in Afghanistan and Iraq,
notion of culture development provides a systemthis aspect of Army culture re-emerged with the downatic and validated approach to changing a culture.
sizing of the Army after Operations Desert Shield and
He identifies five embedding and five reinforcing
Desert Storm. Sullivan appropriately sought to protect
mechanisms. Embedding mechanisms change the
the Army’s core competency of warfighting in a turburoot assumptions held by people, which they use,
lent era. Accordingly, he emphasized training for combat
often unquestioningly, to inform action. Following
in major wars or major regional contingencies. “No more
the call to action that acknowledges the need for
Task Force Smiths!” became the clarion call for the Army
change, embedding mechanisms challenge previto maintain clear tactical and operational focus.9 The
ously unquestioned assumptions and replace them
current cohort of Army general officers were company
with new assumptions—creating a new norm that
grade officers raised on this idea; they would not serve
undergirds the new way of doing business—thus, a
in a “hollow Army.” Throughout their careers, they have
new culture. Reinforcing mechanisms support the
been combat arms leaders—high performers with high
embedding mechanisms by realigning the physical,
potential—developed through the crucible of command
more tangible aspects with the new culture—often
in operating forces. Their career timelines rarely permitreferred to as artifacts. Reinforcing mechanisms are
ted off-track broadening assignments.
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July-August 2015  MILITARY REVIEW