Military Review English Edition July-August 2015 | Page 122

Afghanistan. He asserts that no widely accepted scholarly theories exist to account for why some international state-building ventures succeed while others fail. He
then sets out on a quest to establish a comprehensive
theory in order to propose unified practical approaches
to future state building. The result is a way of matching the right strategy to the right conflict condition in
order to better ensure success.
Miller begins his quest by detailing the history of modern armed state building. Along the way,
he challenges the effectiveness of theories, such as
“sequencing,” noting that truly no single approach to
state building fits all situations. At the heart of his
investigation is identifying the relative effectiveness
of state-building efforts of the past. In doing so, he
analyzes some forty U.S. and international efforts over
approximately the last one hundred years to determine their level of enduring success or failure. He also
accounts for the relative effectiveness of international
institutions in aiding in state building, thus acknowledging the liberalist approach to state building that
has dominated the post-World War II period. Part of
this process includes defining the traits of a functioning state and a failed state. He synthesizes traditional
international-relations theory, characteristics of functional states, and types of state failures, in combination with strategies for state building, into a proposed
theoretical model that he surmises will indicate the
most suitable approach to state building based upon
country-specific characteristics.
Miller applies a cross-section of post-World War
II country cases, both successes and failures, to test his
theory. The country cases range from West Germany,
1945-1955–a success; to Liberia, 1993-1997–a failure. His analysis is sound and persuasive in spite of
the somewhat subjective quality of his defined model
criteria and the brevity of his supporting country-case
studies. It’s not that his definitions are necessarily
wrong, they are just subject to much scholarly debate,
which creates reliability concerns. His country case
studies would have also benefited from greater substantive rigor, thus leaving less doubt over the validity of his
case analysis outcomes.
Although the book reads like a doctoral dissertation, it is nonetheless well-crafted and articulated, with
numerous insightfully presented supporting figures,
tables, and diagrams. He does a good job deriving
120

resources from across the existing body of literature
in framing and supporting his thesis, bringing added
credence to his work.
In recognizing the complex nature of the subject
matter, the author does a commendable job in advancing the body of knowledge in a meaningful way. His
efforts certainly enhance the ongoing debate on how
to best address conflict and post-conflict state building. Of special note, in appendix A of the book, Miller
does an exceptional job in summarizing all United
Nations- and U.S.-led state building interventions
since 1898. This appendix alone is of value to a wide
array of readers.
As a complete body of work, this book is best read
by conflict theory scholars, military and interagency
professionals, international relations/affairs scholars
and practitioners, development economists, and military historians.
Dr. David A. Anderson, Lt. Col., U.S. Marine
Corps, Retired, and William E. Odom, both of
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

ALIEN RULE
Michael Hechter, Cambridge University Press,
New York, 2013, 218 pages

T

he recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have
prompted the growth of a vast subfield of
scholarship on modern imperialism and
intervention into the affairs of other states. Many
scholars are heartily opposed to Bush-era instances
of state building and use studies of earlier empires
as critiques of current or recent U.S. policy. Michael
Hechter’s Alien Rule stands out among this field by
making the controversial suggestion that, although
alien rule—the rule of one group by people not of
that group—often is exploitative, alien rule can be
beneficial to a subjected people.
Alien rulers can become legitimate and effective
if they provide competent, fair, effective government. He finds several examples of successful alien
rule throughout history, and even some contemporary examples, though the latter fall mostly in the
category of academic receivership, some stepfamilies, and business mergers. His most useful sections
July-August 2015  MILITARY REVIEW