Military Review English Edition July-August 2015 | Page 115

MR BOOK REVIEWS INSIDE THE BATAAN DEATH MARCH: Defeat, Travail and Memory Kevin C. Murphy, McFarland & Company, Jefferson, North Carolina, 2014, 328 pages T he surrender of the combined U.S. and Philippine forces following the Battle of Bataan in the Philippines in April 1942 represents the greatest defeat of a U.S. Army. The Bataan Death March, the forcible transfer of sixty to eighty thousand Allied prisoners by the Imperial Japanese army over a distance of more than sixty miles from Bataan to Camp O’Donnell, is viewed by some as the greatest war crime ever perpetuated against American combatants in war. The Bataan Death March marked only the beginning of the great sorrow and travail experienced by thousands of American service members in captivity, aboard hell ships, and in Japanese forced-labor camps. Kevin Murphy, the chair of the Department of Humanities at the University of the Sciences in Philadelphia, provides one of the more comprehensive looks at the Bataan Death March in decades. Previous research focused primarily on survivor accounts of alleged Japanese barbarity and war crimes against Allied prisoners of war—both during the march and during the prisoners’ subsequent incarceration in the Philippines, China, and Japan. Murphy breaks that mold in his consideration of three aspects of the march. The author considers the impact of the overwhelming Japanese army victory over the combined U.S. and Philippine forces and the effect it had on the Allied prisoners. He desc ribes the different dimensions of suffering the Death March survivors experienced while in confinement as well as after the war. Finally, he challenges the recollections of prisoner eyewitness accounts of the alleged Japanese barbarity. The strength of Inside the Bataan Death March is Murphy’s account of an unprepared and underequipped Filipino-American force attempting to defend the Philippines against a numerically superior and MILITARY REVIEW  July-August 2015 better-equipped Imperial Japanese army. He contends that poor leadership by Gen. MacArthur, in addition to climate and language issues within the Filipino forces, exacerbated the dire situation. Murphy’s experience as an English teacher in Japan provides the author with an insight of Japanese history and the culture that contributed to the Japanese mindset pertaining to military personnel and civilians vanquished in war. Less compelling is the author’s attempt to marginalize the Japanese brutality against Allied prisoners of war—and the local Filipino populace—by discrediting the eyewitness accounts of survivors and the local populace. While other factors contributed to the suffering by those forced to endure the Bataan Death March, Murphy ignores the fact that almost 40 percent of Allied prisoners died in Japanese confinement. Conspicuously absent are eyewitness accounts from the Japanese soldiers who participated in the Death March. The only Japanese accounts consist of the trial testimony of Japanese army officers at Gen. Homma’s war crimes trial in 1945. Murphy persuasively tells the story of the Bataan Death March—and those who endured it. Inside the Bataan Death March may be the most comprehensive study of the Bataan Death March in decades. I would highly recommend this book to those interested in the Pacific theater of war or the Imperial Japanese army. Jesse McIntyre III, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas LINCOLN’S CODE: The Laws of War in American History John Fabian Witt, Free Press, New York, 2013, 512 pages W hile visiting the former Confederate Richmond following its seizure by Union forces, President Lincoln counseled operational commander Gen. Godfrey Weitzel, saying, “If I were you, I’d let ‘em up easy.” Along with political intuition and foresight for life after 113