Military Review English Edition July-August 2015 | Page 114

A Response to Matthew T. Penney’s “The Anbar Awakening in
Context… and Why it is Hard to Replicate”
(Military Review, March-April 2015)

I

was pleased to see the excellent article on the
Anbar Awakening in the March-April issue of
Military Review. It did a wonderful job recapping
the discussion on how the Awakening unfolded.
Unfortunately, the discussion of the unique conditions which led to the Awakening was
left for serious students of the movement who survey literature on the
subject. I find such literature hard to
find. Thus, I piece together the few bits
of information I have received to try to
construct a scenario which begs for a
serious critique.
The crux of what I have gathered
from one Army officer I know who
served in 2006 is that Anbar leaders were motivated by the need for
income after funds distributed by
the American forces for civil affairs-type programs
were put under much tighter control. I can believe
this could have been the cause since many articles in
Military Review have explained conflict in Iraq as
arising from economic conditions.
I have a hard time believing Anbar leaders started
working with American troops because they were repulsed by the brutality of extremist factions in Iraq, since
they seemed to embrace these faction so widely once
again in 2014. However, just as former Ba’athist party
loyalists reacted violently when their pensions were cut
off by the American occupation forces in 2003, they
again reacted violently in 2014 after being economically
marginalized by their own government.

I also look at who the leaders of the American forces
in Iraq were from 2004 until 2006, the year the Anbar
Awakening started. Gen. Casey was the senior commander of forces in Iraq for most of this period. I never
heard him described as having a strong focus on economic matters in Iraq.
In contrast, Gen. Chiarelli, as the
commander over forces in Sadr City in
2004, had a strong focus on economic
issues, going so far as to cause a massive
reallocation of money for contracted
projects in his area of control. He credits these economic measures as critical
for his success in suppressing the uprising in Sadr City that greeted him when
he arrived with his forces in 2004.
In 2006, Gen. Chiarelli arrived in
Iraq to once again be faced with a massive uprising after the bombing of the Golden Mosque.
While forces under his command did plenty of fighting,
Chiarelli put a great emphasis on expanding employment
opportunities for the Iraqis. When the discussion of surge
troops came up in late 2006, Chiarelli responded, “I don’t
need more troops, I need more jobs” Of course, jobs are
.
what was created in reaction to the Anbar Awakening as
former enemies were put on the payroll.
Once again, this is all conjecture. It would be nice
for Military Review to publish a piece describing
how much of economic impetus there was for the
Anbar Awakening.
Thanks.
John Stettler, Dallas, Texas

“The Anbar Awakening in Context … and Why It Is so Hard to Replicate,” Matthew T. Penney, PhD
The author proposes the Anbar Awakening be used as a template for developing counterinsurgency
programs elsewhere as long as the differences in culture and situational context in such efforts are
accounted for. The author provides an analysis of the Awakening and explains how its lessons can be
applied in the future.
The original article can be found in our March-April 2015 issue on page 106, by clicking on the link for
the electronic version, or by clicking on the article cover for the Joomag version.
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20150430_art016.pdf

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July-August 2015  MILITARY REVIEW