Military Review English Edition July-August 2015 | Page 110

the tribes’ “younger generations that they will replace the
older generation” in territories under IS control, according
to United Arab Emirates-based analyst Hassan Hassan.24
The Iraqi government pointed to intratribal divisions as a
reason that it withheld military aid to Sunni tribes fighting IS, claiming there was a risk that weapons delivered to
them would end up in IS’s hands.25
Though the tribes that joined IS’s offensive often
disagreed with IS’s extreme interpretation of Islam, many
felt alienated by the Maliki regime and saw IS as a bulwark
against the Baghdad government’s sectarian agenda.26
Zaydan al-Jibouri, an Anbari tribal leader, explained the
decision by some of his tribesman to join IS: “The Sunni
community has two options. Fight against IS and allow
Iran and its militias to rule us, or do the opposite. We chose
IS for only one reason. IS only kills you. The Iraqi government kills you and rapes your women.”27
IS’s relationship with the tribes was always delicate
and susceptible to disruption. Even in the early days
of IS’s push into Iraq, some tribal leaders publicly
stated that their alliance with IS was temporary and
could be reversed if changes occurred in Baghdad. For
instance, Ali Hatem al-Suleiman claimed, “When we
get rid of the government, we will be in charge of the
security file in the regions, and then our objective will
be to expel terrorism—the terrorism of the government and that of IS.”28

Given this early tribal unease with IS, the jihadist
group’s brutal tactics and heavy-handed governance
approach created further rifts with its erstwhile Sunni
tribal allies. The Islamic State’s decision to declare a
caliphate and demand that all Sunnis swear allegiance
to the caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, was deeply divisive,
and a number of tribal sheikhs refused to pledge allegiance to Baghdadi.
Despite this, IS gained a stronger foothold in Anbar
after the fall of Mosul in June 2014 through a powerful
offensive that resulted, among other things, in the group’s
slaughter of the Albu Nimr. Almost immediately upon
gaining ground in Anbar, IS targeted the original Sawha
families that had helped fill the ranks of the local Iraqi
police during the surge era. This meant that in al-Qaim,
the Abu Mahal were targeted; in Hit, the Albu Nimr; in
Haditha, the Abu Jugayfa; and in Ramadi, the Abu Risha,
Thyabi, and Fahadawi.

Conclusion
The Iraq War shaped the way both IS and al-Qaida
understand the role of local populations, and the two
organizations learned diametrically opposed lessons from
the war. Al-Qaida came to believe that AQI’s brutality
had alienated local populations and fomented resistance,
thus contributing to the organization’s downfall. As a
result, al-Qaida instructed its affiliates to be less intrusive

(Photo by Karim Kadim, Associated Press)

Iraqi Shia tribal fighters deploy with their weapons while chanting slogans against the Islamic State 3 June 2014 in Baghdad's Sadr City,
Iraq. The tribal leaders declared their readiness, along with that of their tribesmen, to help the military and take up arms against the Islamic State, which had made advances into Iraq's Sunni heartland.
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July-August 2015  MILITARY REVIEW