Military Review English Edition July-August 2015 | Page 108

the situation for Sons of Iraq members deteriorated quickly. Though the U.S. government and Sunni politicians tried
to promote the Sahwa’s integration into the ministries of
interior and defense, starting in 2010 the Baghdad government began taking steps to weaken Sahwa forces. Baghdad
stripped fighters of their military ranks, reduced pay, seized
weapons, and arrested fighters on the suspicion of supporting terrorist groups. The government also dragged its
feet on providing government jobs to Awakening forces.
In turn, hundreds of Sons of Iraq members defected to
the Sunni insurgents, who adopted a carrot-and-stick
recruitment approach: they targeted Awakening members
for death but, at the same time, promised larger salaries
than the Iraqi government paid if these fighters instead
switched sides.18
Those who refused to rejoin the insurgency found themselves increasingly vulnerable to attack by AQI operatives.
For example, from July through September 2013, AQI militants killed fifty-four Sahwa members.19 The most notable
attack during that stretch came in August when al-Qaida
gunmen assassinated Sheikh Hazem Hajem al-Jawali,
who had played a critical role in establishing Sahwa in the
Kirkuk area in 2008. Shortly before al-Jawali’s assassination, he received a phone call from a man claiming to be
an AQI leader, who threatened him if he refused to resign
from Sahwa. But al-Jawali refused to be intimidated. On 19
August, his car was cut off by gunmen while he was driving
to a souq (open-air market) in al-Rashad. His final act was
trying to use his body to shield his three-year-old niece from
the hail of bullets, but both were killed.
When U.S. troops withdrew from Iraq in December
2011, the Shia-led government headed by Nouri al-Maliki almost immediately issued an arrest warrant for the
highest-ranking Sunni politician, Vice President Tareq alHashimi, who was also the leader of the Iraqi Islamic Party.
Baghdad’s uneven treatment of Sunni populations and
neighborhoods was accompanied by an escalation in the
war in neighboring Syria. The combination of these factors
gave new life to AQI.

Anbar’s Protest Camps and Escalating
Sectarian Tensions
In December 2012, Baghdad’s Shia-led government
issued arrest warrants for the bodyguards of then minister of finance Rafi al-Essawi. Like Hashimi, Essawi was
a former leader in the Iraqi Islamic Party and a known
supporter of the early vigilante groups that had fought AQI
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in Anbar. With Hashimi in exile, and new efforts made
to target al-Essawi, Sunnis in Anbar mounted peaceful
protests. They demanded the release of prisoners from
the many raids conducted in Anbar by counterterrorism
forces controlled by Maliki, and demanded the repeal of
the de-Baathification law that Sunnis believed was only
enforced against them.
Many tribal leaders who were the symbols of the
Sahwa supported these protests, which started in Fallujah
and spread throughout Anbar. These leaders included
Ahmed Abu Risha, Ali Hatem al-Suleiman, Mohammed
Mahmood Latif al-Fahadawi, and others. Tribal leaders
funded daily meals for protestors. Speakers would give
sermons at the protest sites, encouraging protesters to
denounce the use of violence while demanding that their
rights be granted. Maliki’s Shia-led government accused
protest organizers of inciting sectarianism, violence, and
sympathy for al-Qaida, and it pressured the Anbari government to end the protests.
As part of his party’s campaign in Iraq’s provincial
elections in April 2013, Maliki continued to denounce the
peaceful protests as a Baathist and AQI scheme to destabilize his government in Baghdad. Five Iraqi soldiers had
been killed in Fallujah in January 2013, and Maliki blamed
the protesters for targeting the ISF. He promised to take
on the protestors. The central government then postponed
provincial elections in Anbar and Nineveh, claiming the
security situation did not permit them. This further enraged the Sunni protesters.
After the postponed Anbari provincial election was
held in June 2013, a new provincial government was
formed—led by supporters and organizers of the Anbar
protests. The new provincial leaders, led by Governor
Ahmed al-Thyabi (whose tribe was active in the vigilante efforts against al-Qaida in 2005) said it was time for
the protesters to take their demands to Baghdad. Protest
organizers became aware that AQI supporters had by now
infiltrated protest sites. While the protests remained peaceful, the rhetoric at the protests had shifted in a more militant direction, and there were increasing calls for Sunnis to
defend themselves from raids and arrests by forming the
Free Iraqi Army and tribal protection forces.
Many Sunni organizers disliked AQI’s presence in the
protests but chose not to confront AQI. They knew they
would not be protected in any confrontation with AQI.20
Some organizers, mainly those associated with Ahmed
Abu Risha, called on protesters to give the political process
July-August 2015  MILITARY REVIEW