Military Review English Edition July-August 2014 - Page 85

AMERICA’S FRONTIER WARS If we do not, we risk the mistakes of the past. “While European military revolutions provided states with the means to project power into the interior of North America, they did not provide troops with appropriate training and tactics to succeed on the frontier.”16 Therefore, our forces, doctrine, and tactics must continue to embrace agility and adaptability and prepare for a range of missions. The Army continues to do so in its most recent doctrinal publications, FM 1 and FM 30.17 Efforts to address asymmetric threats must also retain the unique American strengths—superior training, leadership, and technology—that give us an edge against any potential adversary. Finally, we must guard against arrogance. An account at the time of Braddock’s defeat noted the irony that his preparations for the march to Fort Duquesne were precise. He attended to every minute detail except “the one that mattered most: Indian affairs.”18 He dismissed those Ohio Indian chiefs who might have been allies for his expedition as savages who could not possibly assist disciplined troops. We must not fall into the same trap of underestimating a potential adversary because of his different culture or seemingly inferior capability. To do so would be to repeat the errors of the past with potentially devastating future consequences. Notes 1. Fred Anderson, Crucible of War: The Seven Years’ War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754-1766 (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000), 94-107. 2. Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johns ۈRK\