Military Review English Edition July-August 2014 - Page 83

by Bouquet’s brilliant feigned retreat and flanking New Threats maneuvers; it also shows how an enemy can use We have seen the great utility of examining deception effectively. The official history of Bushy historical conflicts between Europeans and Native Run says Bouquet’s forces were engaged and surAmericans to learn lessons about possible future rounded by Indian forces at least equal in size to his conflict. Yet there are two additional dimensions to own. However, when I toured the battlefield, Indian asymmetric warfare that must be mentioned—the re-creators, who have studied the battle extensively threat of weapons of mass destruction, potentially from the Indian point of view, maintained that the used against the American homeland, and of cyberIndians numbered no more than 90 and that the tacattacks on U.S. military, government, and private tics they used in the forest made their numbers seem information systems. larger. This disparity is a good example of attempts At the heart of asymmetry is the assumption that to confuse conventional forces so that the size of the an adversary will choose to attack the weakest point. opposing force is impossible to discern. In the case of the United States, asymmetric tools may Finally, the Indian campaigns provide some excelwell entail terrorist acts—with or without nuclear, lent examples of the role of technological advances in biological, or chemical weapons—on the U.S. homeland asymmetric campaigns. Noted historian Armstrong designed to disrupt deployments, limit access, erode Starkey emphasizes that the Europeans arrived in North public support, and take the fight to the American peoAmerica during a time of military revolution in Europe: ple. In some respects, this homeland tactic is not new. “European soldiers brought the new weapons a