Military Review English Edition July-August 2014 - Page 63

ARMY EXPERIMENTATION Factors studied Findings Combat power of brigade combat teams Army 2020 force design updates increase the combat power of the brigade combat team. Operations at corps and division Army 2020 force design updates and legacy systems limit corps and division commanders’ ability to control operational tempo and limit flexibility of assigning missions to subordinate units. Assets for division and below Army 2020 force design updates result in critical shortfalls in the number of surveillance, reconnaissance, military police, engineer, air and missile defense, network, and intelligence assets available at division and below. Low-density, high-value assets The vulnerability of low-density, high-value assets creates risk to the mission and the force. Skills for conducting major combat operations Basic skills required for the conduct of major combat operations have atrophied or are nonresident. Implementation of new designs Commanders must take into account the additional time, training, and integration required by the Army 2020 force designs. Air-ground interactions The increase of air-ground interactions (such as fixed wing, rotary wing, unmanned aerial vehicle, air defense artillery, rockets, mortar, and missiles) has created a complex airspace coordination problem. Command and control Army 2020 force design updates increase command and control challenges and require a greater understanding of battlefield systems. Doctrine Army 2020 will require updates to and clarification of doctrine. Integration, coordination, and synchronization of forces Army 2020 increases the capability to integrate, coordinate, and synchronize assets at corps and division. Table 2. FY 2013 experimentation findings • Fires. • Sustainment design and support concept. • Intelligence 2020 initiatives. • Protection and maneuver support. • Aviation. • Medical. The 2013 experimentation campaign was composed of six events designed to address sequenced operational activities including theater shaping, transition to combat, combat, and transition from combat to peacetime. Each experiment evaluated organization design, organization performance, capabilities required to perform tasks, and personnel skills executed across the joint operational phases. Table 2 summarizes the FY 2013 experimentation findings.11 In a cooperative effort with 2nd Infantry Division, aspects of Army 2020 were included in the division’s Mission Command Training Program Warfighter MILITARY REVIEW  July-August 2014 exercise conducted in Korea in December 2013. This provided an opportunity to “test drive” select Army 2020 initiatives in a real-world environment and captured subject matter expert feedback on Army 2020 operational and organizational concepts. This event examined operations in a certain set of conditions, within an exercise environment that imposed a particular set of constraints, limitations, and assumptions. Despite these limitations, the event provided an essential operational perspective to augment experimentation results. Both years of Army-level experimentation, followed by a 2014 division-level operational assessment, yielded very consistent results on the impact of future force designs on the Army’s posture.12 These findings merit deliberate consideration for future force design, development, and implementation. Army 2020 designs generally performed as intended. However, it became clear that resiliency must be a 61