Military Review English Edition July-August 2014 - Page 59

STRATEGIC SUCCESS What is the Solution? The Army must learn how to adopt genuine strategic thought. It will need to figure out how to apply strategic thinking in institutional and operational settings and at different echelons. It will need to determine ways to use strategic thinking to enhance time-constrained decision making during operations as well as to develop strategic policy guidance as part of the professional requirement to give advice to civilian leaders. Army senior leaders will apply strategic thinking differently than mid-level commanders, staffs, or soldiers on the ground. The Army already has a good start on some initiatives that will improve its ability to use qualitative analysis. One example is improving cultural awareness through regionally aligned forces. The Army can further improve its use of qualitative analysis in three broad ways: • Encouraging deep familiarity with the social science theories and debates that drive policy making by sending more officers to top-rated university doctoral programs, Increasing the emphasis on teaching the Army design methodology in professional military education, and Encouraging questioning during educational experiences and during staff planning. The future is filled with complex political-military conflicts. Only an Army culture steeped in the ethos of strategic thinking and the qualitative approach that supports it will succeed in connecting military victory to long-term strategic success. This was the tradition of the Army at its finest, under Washington, Grant, Marshall, and Eisenhower—who were among the finest strategic and qualitative thinkers of their time. The conflicts of the 21st century will demand the same of today’s Army. There is no reason that challe nge cannot be met and every reason it must be. • • NOTES 1. The phrase “political, economic, psychological, and military forces” comes from a definition of strategy that appeared in the 1964 edition of the Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage, as quoted in Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1987). 2. Thanks to my student Eric Fowler for inspiring these examples. See Eric Fowler, 2012. Will-to-Fight: Japan’s Imperial Institution and the U.S. Strategy at the End of World War II. Monograph for the School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 3., s.v. “context,” accessed 23 June 2013, 4. Barbara Czarniawska-Joerges, Narratives in Social Science Research (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2004). 5. Martin E. Dempsey, 2012. Gen. Martin E. Dempsey Speaks at Duke University. Lecture, Ambassador S. Davis Phillips Family International Lecture Series, Durham, NC, 12 January, gen-martin-e-dempsey-speaks-duke-university. 6. Antoine Bousquet, The Scientific Way of Warfare: Order and Chaos on the Battlefields of Modernity (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009). 7. William DuPuy quoted in William J. Mullen and Ronnie L. MILITARY REVIEW  July-August 2014 Brownlee, Changing an Army: An Oral History of General William DePuy, USA Retired (Carlisle, PA: Army Military History Institute, 1986), 183. 8. For an overview of the “revolution in military affairs” debate, see Tim Benbow, The Magic Bullet?: Understanding the Revolution in Military Affairs (London: Brassey’s, 2004). 9. Steven Weinberg, “What Science Can Explain,” New York Review Books, 20 September 2001, articles/archives/2001/sep/20/what-science-can-explain/. 10. Leslie P. Hartley, The Go-Between (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1953). 11. Rick “Ozzie” Nelson, Nathan Freier, and Maren Leed, “Iraq Versus Afghanistan: A Surge is Not a Surge is Not a Surge,” the Center for Strategic and International Studies website, blog entry posted on (23 October 2009), iraq-versus-afghanistan-surge-not-surge-not-surge. 12., s.v. “strategy,” accessed 23 June 2013, 13. Bent Flyvbjerg, “Social Science That Matters,” Foresight Europe, no. 2 (October 2005-March 2006): 38. 14. Everett C. Dolman, Pure Strategy: Power and Principle in the Space and Information Age (New York: Frank Cass, 2005). 15. Deborah A. Stone, “Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas,” Political Science Quarterly, 104(2)(1989): 281-300. 57